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Incorporation by Reference:  
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I.  THE FORMULA 
(INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE) 
The talismanic practice of repeating and realleging facts in each count in a 
pleading is particularly dreadful: 
Each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 45 of this Complaint 
is hereby repeated, reiterated, and realleged with the same force and effect and 
incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein at length and in detail. 
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Most practitioners use a shorter but equally exasperating formula for 
“incorporation by reference.” A 25-page simple complaint with seven counts, 
for example, would have seven useless boilerplate paragraphs, repeating the 
formula seven times at the beginning of each count, mechanically incorporating 
previous paragraphs, whether relevant or not. Without these wasteful 
paragraphs, the complaint would be one full page shorter. 
Modern pleadings have no place for antiquated practices or for useless 
words. But so far this practice has eluded American lawyers, who do it without 
knowing what they are doing or why they are doing it. 
It is common to justify the practice of incorporation by reference by 
arguing that “[r]ealleging by reference saves the story from redundancy and 
tedium.”1 This is a centuries-old, recycled explanation. Two centuries ago, in an 
English book widely published in the United States, Joseph Chitty famously 
said: 
In framing a second or subsequent count for the same cause of action, care 
should be taken to avoid any unnecessary repetition of the same matter, and by 
an inducement in the first count, applying any matter to the following counts, and 
by referring concisely in the subsequent counts to such inducement, much 
unnecessary prolixity may be avoided.2 
Chitty’s statement was the standard explanation for incorporation by reference; 
it was cited and plagiarized in dozens of decisions and books for several decades 
in the 1800s. 
More than a century later, in 1913, in the United States, the justification 
remained the same:  
Good pleading demands a plain and concise statement of the facts 
constituting the cause of action . . . without unnecessary recital or 
repetition; . . . it is good practice in stating a second cause of action to refer to 
some prior allegation in the first cause of action to avoid repetition.3 
The same justification for incorporation by reference is echoed today in the 
two most comprehensive treatises on federal practice.4 It is as if Chitty’s treatise 
on pleading is still being read today. 
 
 1. Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Untold Stories: Restoring Narrative to Pleading Practice, 15 J. 
LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 28 (2009). 
 2. 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON PLEADING AND ON THE PARTIES TO ACTIONS AND THE 
FORMS OF ACTIONS 396 (New York, Robert M’Dermut 1809). The last American edition of this treatise, 
published almost a century later, contained the same statement. See 1 CHITTY, supra, at 428–29 (Henry Greening 
& J.C. Perkins eds., Springfield, Mass., G & C Merriam, 7th Eng. ed. & 16th Am. ed. 1876); see also Phillips 
v. Fielding (1792) 126 Eng. Rep. 464, 469 (KB) (praising incorporation by reference as a means of streamlining 
documents); Stiles v. Nokes (1806) 103 Eng. Rep. 191, 194–95; 7 East 493, 502, 506 (KB) (same). 
 3. Maxwell Steel Vault Co. v. Nat’l Casket Co., 205 F. 515, 522 (N.D.N.Y. 1913); see also Griswold v. 
Nat’l Ins. Co., 3 Cow. 96, 105 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824); Loomis v. Swick, 3 Wend. 205, 207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829). 
 4. See 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1326 (3d 
ed. 2018) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c) permits the pleader to use an incorporation by reference of 
prior allegations . . . to encourage pleadings that are short, concise, and free of unwarranted repetition . . . .”); 2 
JEFFREY A. PARNESS, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 10.04 (2018) (updated by the Hon. Jerry E. Smith) 
(noting that incorporation by reference “eliminates redundancy and repetition”); see also CHARLES EDWARD 
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Incorporation by reference, however, is useless. If the objective is to avoid 
repetition, the solution cannot be to reiterate the facts through an inherently 
repetitive formula. Incorporation by reference is the quintessential redundancy. 
The narrative would be even less redundant and less tedious if parties did not 
reallege facts previously alleged in the same document. 
Yet current legal writing5 and civil procedure6 books explicitly teach 
incorporation by reference. Most transcribe complaints with the offending 
formula, validating its use.7 Formbooks perpetuate the formula amongst 
practitioners.8 Books that don’t teach the formula either fail to provide a model 
complaint, present simple complaints with only one count, or do not number the 
paragraphs.9 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure add to the confusion. Rule 10(c) 
prescribes that “a statement in a pleading may be adopted by reference elsewhere 
 
CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 37, at 149 (1928) (“[T]he practice would prevent the 
repetitions of allegations.”). 
 5. See, e.g., MARGARET TEMPLE-SMITH & DEBORAH E. CUPPLES, LEGAL DRAFTING: LITIGATION 
DOCUMENTS, CONTRACTS, LEGISLATION, AND WILLS 34 (2013) (“To avoid redundancy, an attorney can re-allege 
a paragraph containing a previously alleged fact or incorporate the material by reference.”); DEBORAH E. 
BOUCHOUX, ASPEN HANDBOOK FOR LEGAL WRITERS: A PRACTICAL REFERENCE 215 (4th ed. 2017); IAN 
GALLACHER, A FORM AND STYLE MANUAL FOR LAWYERS 130–31 (2005) (“First, however, you should 
reincorporate all your facts at the start of each count in the complaint.”). 
 6. See, e.g., RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.3.1 (3d ed. 2012); STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE & 
WILLIAM M. JANSSEN, A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 186 (2018); JACK H. 
FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.13, at 286–89 (4th ed. 2005); 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., JOHN LEUBSDORF & DEBRA LYN BASSETT, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.7 (6th ed. 2011); 
LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 556 (4th ed. 2009). 
 7. See, e.g., HEIDI K. BROWN, THE MINDFUL LEGAL WRITER: MASTERING PREDICTIVE AND PERSUASIVE 
WRITING 299 (2016); CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 406 (7th ed. 2014); VEDA R. 
CHARROW ET AL., CLEAR AND EFFECTIVE LEGAL WRITING 34 (5th ed. 2013); BRANDT GOLDSTEIN ET AL., A 
DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO STORMING THE COURT 23 (2009); LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, 
A DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO A CIVIL ACTION 78 (4th ed. 2008); NAN D. HUNTER, THE POWER OF 
PROCEDURE: THE LITIGATION OF JONES V. CLINTON 14 (2002); ADAM LAMPARELLO & MEGAN E. BOYD, SHOW, 
DON’T TELL: LEGAL WRITING FOR THE REAL WORLD 90–102 (2014); KRISTEN KONRAD TISCIONE, RHETORIC 
FOR LEGAL WRITERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ANALYSIS AND PERSUASION 178 (2d ed. 2016). 
 8. See, e.g., 11 AM. JUR. PLEADING AND PRACTICE FORMS Federal Practice and Procedure § 159 (2018); 
19C id. §§ 15–16 (2019); 1A NICHOLS CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE FORMS § 38:29 (2018) 
(“[Plaintiff/Defendant] repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs [number of 
paragraph] and [number of paragraph], inclusive, of this [complaint/answer/[type of pleading]] with the same 
effect as if they were repeated in full in this paragraph.” (alterations in original)); HERZOG’S BANKRUPTCY 
FORMS & PRACTICE § 6:3 (Nov. 2018); 2C WEST’S FEDERAL FORMS, DISTRICT COURTS-CIVIL §§ 10:62–10:65 
(5th ed. 2018); 25B WEST’S MCKINNEY’S FORMS ELECTION LAW § 6-132 Form 5 (2018); 4A NEW YORK 
PRACTICE, COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS § 52:44 (4th ed. 2018); 1 LA COE’S FLORIDA 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE r. 1.110(128) (2018) (giving suggestions of best practices); 2 MICHIGAN COURT 
RULES PRACTICE, FORMS § 26:25 (2018) (giving five different options of a similar useless formula, including 
“repeats and realleges,” “incorporates . . . adopts . . . and realleges,” and “reiterates and restates”). 
 9. See, e.g., BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK 444–45 (6th ed. 2013); LAUREL CURRIE OATES & ANNE 
ENQUIST, THE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK: ANALYSIS, RESEARCH, AND WRITING (6th ed. 2014); DIANA V. 
PRATT, LEGAL WRITING: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 24 (5th ed. 2015); MARY BARNARD RAY, THE BASICS OF 
LEGAL WRITING (rev. 1st ed. 2008); TERESA J. REID RAMBO & LEANNE J. PFLAUM, LEGAL WRITING BY DESIGN 
(2d ed. 2013); HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 378–82 (6th ed. 2013). 
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in the same pleading or in any other pleading or motion.”10 It is a norm without 
context, a permission without obligation. 
Despite being useless, the practice lives on. It is a silly American 
idiosyncrasy, a ritualistic recitation that clutters complaints, answers, and 
indictments. It serves no purpose, makes no sense, and is not used in any other 
legal system. It is there, we can see it, but no one remembers what it is for. And 
no one asks questions. To borrow an expression of evolutionary biology, 
incorporation by reference is merely a vestigial evolutionary feature of our 
litigation procedures, like our vestigial tail. 
The time has come for the legal profession to strike this useless recitation 
from our pleadings and adopt a twenty-first century style. This Article will 
explain why lawyers had to do it in the past and why they do not need to 
anymore. 
II.  THE DOGMA  
(THE NEED TO REALLEGE ALL FACTS IN EACH COUNT) 
A. THE DOGMA IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN COMMON-LAW PLEADING 
The practice of incorporation by reference can be traced back more than 
four centuries, possibly earlier, back to the Middle Ages. It was forged in the 
Court of Common Pleas and in the King and Queen’s Bench, in a past so remote 
that the reports were handwritten on parchment rolls (plea rolls).11 The records 
of the cases were written in Latin, and many books, in Latin or Law French. The 
cases are serviceable today only because they were translated into English, 
generally in a summary of only a few lines. 
Incorporation by reference allowed efficient writing at a time when the 
formulaic common-law pleading rule in England (later transplanted to the 
United States) substantially restricted the joinder of claims in a legal proceeding. 
The general rule (subject to debate, exceptions, complications, and litigation) 
was that a plaintiff could only join claims that required the same kind of 
judgment, were between the same parties, and proceeded under the same form 
of action.12  
 
 10. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c). 
 11. Over a million sheep gave their skins to produce the official record of six centuries of court business 
in England. See Pym Yeatman, Our Common Law Records, 4 LAW MAG. & REV. 162, 169 (1875); Publication 
of the Ancient Common Law Records, 2 CENT. L.J. 149, 149–50 (1875). It is ironic that the earliest case on 
incorporation by reference is about the sale of wool. See infra Subpart III.B (discussing Barnes v. May (1591) 
78 Eng. Rep. 496, Cro. Eliz. 240). 
 12. See 1 CHITTY, supra note 2, at 196, 200 (“The joinder of action depends on the form of the action, 
rather than on the subject matter of it . . . ."); EDWARD LAWES, AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON PLEADING IN 
CIVIL ACTIONS 72 (London, C. Roworth 1806); ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL 
COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 111–22 (1952) (discussing the evolution of joinder of claims in common 
law and code pleading); FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 451–63 (2d ed. 
1977) (same); HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 279–80 
(London, G. Woodfall 1824); 1 JOHN SIMCOE SAUNDERS, THE LAW OF PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CIVIL 
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The idiosyncratic common-law pleading system, with its arcane 
technicalities, was elevated to a “science.”13 Its excessive formalism generated 
several distortions which in turn produced inequitable outcomes and 
inconvenient proceedings. For example, a plaintiff could join two claims arising 
out of entirely different facts, however inconvenient, as long as they followed 
the same form of action. But a plaintiff could not join claims arising out of the 
same occurrence if they proceeded under different forms of actions, even if they 
required the same evidence and produced a convenient trial package.14 
In the limited circumstances in which a plaintiff could join claims, each 
count (claim, cause of action, action, paragraph) had to be “separately stated.”15 
This rule meant that each count had to be set separately from the other, 
eventually in a separate grammatical paragraph. The objective was to facilitate 
the work of the opponent and the court.16 This requirement is commonsensical 
and continues to exist today for the same reason.17 
 
ACTIONS 418 (London, S. Sweet 1828); BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HAND-BOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING § 254, 
at 363–64 (St. Paul, Minn., West Publ’g Co., 2d ed. 1895); GEORGE L. PHILLIPS, AN EXPOSITION OF THE 
PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING UNDER THE CODES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 123, at 106–07 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 
1896); Edson R. Sunderland, Joinder of Actions, 18 MICH. L. REV. 571, 572 (1920) (“Most of the restrictions 
which the law placed upon such joinder can be shown by experience to be useless.”); William Wirt Blume, A 
Rational Theory for Joinder of Causes of Action and Defences, and for the Use of Counterclaims, 26 MICH. L. 
REV. 1 (1927) (discussing the irrationality of the old rules of joinder of claims). 
 13. See LITTLETON’S TENURES 108 (London, Thomas Wright 1600) (1481) (originally published in French) 
(“[I]t is one of the most honorable, laudable, and profitable things in our law, to have the science of well 
pleading . . . .”); 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A 
COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON § 10, at 17.a. (Francis Hargrave & Charles Butler eds., Kite & Walton 1853) 
(1628); 2 id. § 534, at 303.a.; see also PHILEMON BLISS, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF PLEADING iii (St. Louis, 
Mo., F.H. Thomas & Co. 1879) (“[T]o be a good pleader gave one an advantage and a rank among his fellows 
to be acquired by no other single accomplishment.”); JAMES GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF 
PLEADING, IN CIVIL ACTIONS vii (Boston, Lilly & Wait 1832) (“[T]he science of pleading [is] . . . the most 
instructive branch of the common law.”); STEPHEN, supra note 12, at v (“The science of pleading . . . always 
among the highest in professional estimation . . . .”).  
 14. See Blume, supra note 12, at 8 (noting that a plaintiff could join a range of claims, even if they were 
“incongruous and unrelated,” so long as they “could all be included under one form of original writ” (emphasis 
added)); JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 12, § 10.2, at 453–54 (“[O]n the other hand, claims which arose out of 
the very same occurrence could not be joined if they required different forms of action for their redress.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Boeckler v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 10 Mo. App. 448, 450, 456 (1881); St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. 
City of St. Louis, 86 Mo. 495, 499 (1885); Eaton v. Or. Ry. & Navigation Co., 19 Or. 391, 392 (1890). 
 16. See, e.g., 1 EDGAR B. KINKEAD, THE LAW OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND DEFENSES UNDER THE 
CODE § 20, at 17–21 (Cincinnati, Ohio, W.H. Anderson & Co. 1895) (“The object of [separately stating and 
numbering causes of action] is not only to preserve . . . the legal distinction between causes of action in a petition, 
but to enable a defendant to answer fully, definitely, and clearly, that the facts alleged may be denied or admitted, 
and the court readily understand the principal points in controversy.”); CLAUDIUS L. MONELL, A TREATISE ON 
THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK ADAPTED TO THE CODE OF PROCEDURE 48 (Albany, 
N.Y., Charles Van Benthuysen 1849) (stating that when several causes of action are in the same complaint, they 
must be separately set out so that the defendant can be aware when he may “have a defence to one and not to the 
other). 
 17. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b) (“A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited 
as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.”); see also, e.g., FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra 
note 6, § 5.13, at 286. 
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But “separately stated” also had another meaning, less obvious and less 
useful. It meant that each count had to contain all facts and elements essential to 
its cause of action, even if they were already mentioned earlier in another count 
of the same pleading.18 If one fact happened to be an element of two or more 
counts, it had to be alleged in each—defects and omissions in one count could 
not be supplied by the allegations in another.19 
The principle behind this dogma was that each claim was perceived as a 
separate pleading or even a separate lawsuit.20 Tellingly, in many old books, 
joinder of claims was called “joinder of actions.”21 Because of that, all counts 
had to be treated as an independent complaint and had to stand by itself: if one 
count was stricken or dismissed, the remaining counts could survive only if they 
were complete.22  
 
 18. See, e.g., Dent’s Adm’r v. Scott, 3 H. & J. 28, 31–32 (Md. Ct. App. 1810) (discussing why “this form 
of pleading . . . is not allowed” and that each count “must be a full declaration of itself, and must not depend 
upon any other count”); Loomis v. Swick, 3 Wend. 205, 207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829); Canterbury v. Hill, 4 Stew. 
& P. 224, 228 (Ala. 1833); see also 1 SAUNDERS, supra note 12, at 417; 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 
245–46 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1839) (defining “count”); WATKIN WILLIAMS, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 99 (London, C. Roworth & Sons 1857). 
 19. See JOHN ANTHON, AMERICAN PRECEDENTS OF DECLARATIONS § 5, at 39 (New York, Gould & Van 
Winkle 1810) (“Any thing in the first count, which is right, cannot help any defect in the second count; though 
they are both in one declaration, yet they are as distinct as if they were in two.”); Nelson v. Swan, 13 Johns. 483, 
484–85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816) (“The second count is imperfect, unless helped by reference to the first; and 
when . . . one count is bad, nothing in that count can be resorted to for the purpose of helping out, and aiding, 
another count.”). 
 20. See Smith v. Aiery (1704) 2 Ld. Raym. 1034, 6 Mod. 128, 129 (Eng.) (“[A]ny Thing in the first Count 
which was right, could not help any Defect in the Second; for tho’ [sic] they both were put in one Declaration, 
yet they were as distinct as if they had been in two several actions.”); Mardis v. Shackleford, 6 Ala. 433, 436 
(1844); Hitchcock v. Munger, 15 N.H. 97, 102 (1844); see also JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, A DIGEST OF THE 
LAW RELATIVE TO PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN ACTIONS REAL, PERSONAL, AND MIXED 172 (New York, 
Stephen Gould & Son 1824); 4 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW, Pleas and Pleading at B1 
(London, Catherine Lintot 1759); 1 CHITTY, supra note 2, at 397; 1 MORRIS M. ESTEE, PRACTICE, PLEADING 
AND FORMS 210, 531 (San Francisco, H.H. Bancroft & Co. 1870); JOHN NORTON POMEROY, REMEDIES AND 
REMEDIAL RIGHTS BY THE CIVIL ACTION §§ 442, 447, 550, 716 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1876); BLISS, 
supra note 13, § 121, at 162. 
 21. See, e.g., 1 CHITTY, supra note 2, at 397; 1 JOHN A. DUNLAP, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW-YORK IN CIVIL ACTIONS 46 (Albany, N.Y., C.S. Van Winkle 1821); SIMEON NASH, 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE 32 (Cincinnati, Ohio, Robert Clarke & Co. rev. 3d ed. 1864); 
GEORGE VAN SANTVOORD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS UNDER THE NEW 
YORK CODE OF PROCEDURE 183 (Nathaniel Co. Moak ed., Albany, N.Y., John D. Parsons, Jr. 1873) (1852); 
SAMUEL MAXWELL, A TREATISE OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 28 
(Lincoln, Neb., Journal Co. 1880); ALEXANDER MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE AT COMMON LAW § 228, at 183 
(1905); 1 JOHN PRENTISS POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN COURTS OF COMMON LAW § 282, at 271 (4th ed. 
1906); Sunderland, supra note 12, at 576; MARTIN P. BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN ACTIONS AT COMMON 
LAW § 473, at 914 (C.H. Morrissett ed., 2d ed. 1921). 
 22. See Phillips v. Fielding (1792) 126 Eng. Rep. 464, 469; 2 H. Bl. 123, 131 (referring to a case in which 
the first counts were dismissed, but the remaining counts were considered sufficient only because they had 
referred to the first one); ANTHON, supra note 19, § 5, at 40 (“The [first] count struck out was considered as in 
existence, and as a part of the record, for the purpose of making the new count and judgment on it good.”); 
Nelson, 13 Johns. at 484; Crookshank v. Gray, 20 Johns. 344, 344–48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823) (dismissing the first 
two counts, but keeping the third count because it made reference to the first); Lattin v. McCarty, 17 How. Pr. 
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Introductory or prefatory information, however, could be stated just once 
at the beginning of the pleading (there was no need to repeat or refer to it at each 
count). Introductory information (also called “matters of inducement” by some 
courts) was a necessary part of the pleading, but contained unessential elements 
of any specific count and was applicable to several of them. Examples given in 
cases and textbooks included the character in which persons were made parties, 
the jurisdiction of the court, the corporate powers of plaintiffs, partnership and 
agreement between the parties, as well as the names, capacity to sue, citizenship, 
marital status, corporate existence, and residence of the parties.23 
B. THE DOGMA IN AMERICAN CODE PLEADING 
The formalistic common-law pleading dogma (requiring each count to 
contain all facts and elements of the cause of action) remained in effect in the 
United States even after 1848, when New York enacted its first Code of 
Procedure, known as the Field Code.24 Soon thereafter, about thirty states 
enacted their own codes of civil procedure emulating the New York model, and 
inaugurating what became known as the American Reform Experience (or code 
pleading). During the following decades in the United States, about half the 
states still followed common-law pleading (modernized and influenced by the 
codes at differing degrees), while the other half followed the then-modern code 
pleading.25 Textbooks and casebooks on common-law pleading were published 
 
239, 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858); see also 1 AUSTIN ABBOTT, BRIEF UPON THE PLEADINGS IN CIVIL ACTIONS 34 & 
n.1 (1904). 
 23. See Sinclair v. Fitch, 3 E.D. Smith 677, 689 (N.Y. Ct. Com. P. 1857); Lowry v. Dutton, 28 Ind. 473, 
474–75 (1867); Aull Sav. Bank v. City of Lexington, 74 Mo. 104, 105 (1881); Thompson v. Edwards, 85 Ind. 
414, 416–17 (1882); Carver v. Carver, 97 Ind. 497, 503 (1884); West v. Eureka Improvement Co., 40 Minn. 
394, 395 (1889); Ronnie v. Ryder, 8 N.Y.S. 5, 6 (City Ct. 1889); Abendroth v. Boardley, 27 Wis. 555, 557 
(1871); Stone v. Wendover, 2 Mo. App. 247 (1876); Thompson v. Edwards, 85 Ind. 414, 416–17 (1882); 
Bigelow v. Drummond, 90 N.Y.S. 913, 914 (App. Div. 1904); see also POMEROY, supra note 20, §§ 575, 716; 
GEORGE W. BRADNER, HAND-BOOK OF THE RULES OF PLEADING FOR NEW YORK STATE 47 (Albany, N.Y., 
Matthew Bender 1892); PHILLIPS, supra note 12, § 204, at 183; EVERETT W. PATTISON, CODE PLEADING AS 
INTERPRETED BY THE COURTS OF MISSOURI § 235, at 138 (1901); 1 ABBOTT, supra note 22, at 36; 1 CLARK A. 
NICHOLS, A TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF RECORD OF NEW YORK 926 (1904); 1 
AUSTIN ABBOTT & CARLOS ALDEN, FORMS OF PLEADING IN ACTIONS FOR LEGAL OR EQUITABLE RELIEF 5 
(Carlos C. Alden ed., 2d ed. 1918). 
 24. N.Y. CODE PROC. § 167 (1848) (amended 1863). The code received its name because of the influence 
of David Dudley Field, widely regarded as its main author and promoter. Compare Letter from Charles 
O’Connor to Messrs. Pope & Haskell (Mar. 14, 1870), in 1 ALBANY L.J. 302, 302 (1870) (“Common fame 
asserts, and without contradiction, that I am aware of, from any quarter, that Mr. David Dudley Field . . . drew 
the whole instrument, and may properly be regarded as its sole author.”), with Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley 
Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 317 
(1988) (“Although Field wrote much of the original version of this partial code, the other two commissioners 
apparently contributed significantly.”). 
 25. See CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA AND 
ENGLAND 8–16 (Cincinnati, Ohio, W.H. Anderson & Co. 1897) (classifying the states); CLARK, supra note 4, 
§ 8 (same).  
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in the United States well into the twentieth century.26 They shared the lawyers’ 
shelves with textbooks and casebooks on code pleading. 
The legislative evolution of the dogma of complete counts in New York, 
through its several codes and rules of procedure, is informative. 
The common-law dogma survived in the New York Field Code of 
Procedure of 1848, which provided that “[t]he plaintiff may unite in the same 
complaint several causes of action . . . . But the causes of action, so 
united, . . . must be separately stated.”27 Although the Field Code made pleading 
and joinder of claims more flexible than the practice at common law, it did not 
change the rule that each cause of action must be “separately stated.”  
The first meaning of “separately stated” in English common-law pleading, 
as previously discussed, is commonsensical: each claim must be stated 
separately from the others to avoid confusion.28 But the interpretation of that 
expression also imported (unnecessarily) its second meaning: that each count 
must be complete and contain all facts and elements essential to the cause of 
action, even if they were already mentioned earlier in another count in the same 
pleading.29 This was the uniform interpretation in New York30 and in all other 
 
 26. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MARTIN, supra note 21; EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, COMMON LAW PLEADING 
(1914); CLARKE B. WHITTIER & EDMUND M. MORGAN, CASES ON COMMON LAW PLEADING (William R. Vance 
ed., 1916); JOHN JAY MCKELVEY, PRINCIPLES OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING (rev. 2d ed. 1917); WALTER 
WHEELER COOK & EDWARD W. HINTON, CASES ON PLEADING AT COMMON LAW (1920); see also SHIPMAN, 
supra note 12, §§ 78–79, at 200–01 (3d ed. 1923); JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, HANDBOOK OF 
COMMON LAW PLEADING (1969). 
 27. N.Y. CODE PROC. § 167 (1848) (amended 1849); see also WILLIAM WAIT, THE CODE OF PROCEDURE 
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 271–72, 305–06 (Albany, N.Y., William Gould & Son 1875); N.Y. CODE CIV. 
PROC. § 663 (1850) (proposed complete New York Code of Civil Procedure). 
 28. See supra Subpart II.A. 
 29. See supra Subpart II.A. 
 30. See, e.g., Benedict v. Seymour, 6 How. Pr. 298, 302 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852); Landau v. Levy, 1 Abb. Pr. 
376, 379–80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855); Sinclair, 3 E.D. Smith at 689 (“[E]ach [cause of action] by itself, and 
unconnected with the other, may show a good cause of action against the defendants.”); Simmons v. Fairchild, 
42 Barb. 404, 409 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1864); Victory Webb v. Beecher, 55 How. Pr., 193, 202–03 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1878); Reiners v. Brandhorst, 59 How. Pr. 91, 92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1879) (“Each separate cause of action must be 
complete in itself and contain everything that is essential . . . to show the plaintiff’s right to relief.” (citation 
omitted)); Wallace v. Jones, 74 N.Y.S. 116, 117 (App. Div. 1902) (holding that the complaint should state in 
each paragraph a separate cause of action and all the facts necessary to make the cause of action facially 
complete); Marietta v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chi. & St. Louis Ry. Co., 100 N.Y.S. 1027, 1028 (Sup. Ct. 1906); 
Daly v. Haight, 146 N.Y.S. 42, 44–45 (App. Div. 1914). 
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code pleading (and common-law) states.31 And the dogma of complete counts 
was widely taught in all professional books.32 
By the time the Field Code was enacted in 1848, there was no reason why 
“separately stated” also meant “completely stated,” except inertia. This 
backward interpretation was comfortable for practitioners trained in the old 
system, who read old English common-law pleading books.33 Even at the time, 
this interpretation was unwarranted. David Dudley Field’s main objective was 
to bring relief to the formalistic common-law pleading.34 When code pleading 
abolished the old forms of action and merged law and equity, the parties needed 
only to plead the facts constituting the cause of action or defense, and the court 
would apply the law to the facts.35 The Field Code imported this model from 
Equity practice.36 
Although code pleading was not free from technicalities, the enactment of 
the Field Code was the perfect intellectual environment to abandon the old 
common-law dogma of complete counts. It was, therefore, the first wasted 
opportunity in the United States to abandon the old dogma, beating England by 
a few years.37 
 
 31. See, e.g., Holton v. Muzzy, 30 Vt. 365, 374–75 (1858); Leabo v. Detrick, 18 Ind. 414, 415 (1862); 
Sabin v. Austin, 19 Wis. 421, 423 (1865); Day v. Vallette, 25 Ind. 42, 43 (1865) (“Each paragraph must contain 
within itself sufficient averments to constitute a good cause of action.”); Mason v. Weston, 29 Ind. 561, 564 
(1868); Stewart v. Balderston, 10 Kan. 131, 144–45 (1872); Haskell v. Haskell, 54 Cal. 262, 265–66 (1880); 
Entsminger v. Jackson, 73 Ind. 144, 145–46 (1880); Clark v. Whittaker Iron Co., 9 Mo. App. 446, 448–49 
(1881); Porter v. Drennan, 13 Ill. App. 362, 365 (1883); Leavenworth, N. & S. Ry. Co. v. Wilkins, 26 P. 16, 16–
17 (Kan. 1891); Reading v. Reading, 30 P. 803, 804 (Cal. 1892); Ramsey v. Johnson, 52 P. 1084, 1085 (Wyo. 
1898); Merrill v. Post Pub. Co., 83 N.E. 419, 423 (Mass. 1908); Nat’l Lumber Co. v. Wickliffe, 125 P. 357, 358 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1912); Gardner v. W. Union Tel. Co., 81 S.E. 259, 260 (Ga. Ct. App. 1914); Smith v. Phila., Balt. 
& Wash. R.R. Co., 115 A. 416, 418–19 (Del. Super. Ct. 1921); Ross v. Chi. & Alton R.R. Co., 225 Ill. App. 
633, 638 (1922); Saffold v. Anderson, 134 S.E. 81, 83 (Ga. 1926); A. Mortellaro & Co. v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. 
Co., 107 So. 528, 529 (Fla. 1926); Paterson & Edey Lumber Co. v. Carolina-Portland Cement Co., 112 So. 245, 
250 (Ala. 1927); Lance v. Boroughs, 102 S.E.2d 167, 169 (Ga. 1958). 
 32. See, e.g., BRADNER, supra note 23, at 14, 48; CLARK, supra note 4, § 70, at 312–16; POMEROY, supra 
note 20, §§ 442, 447, 550, 716; PHILLIPS, supra note 12, §§ 123, 202–04; SHIPMAN, supra note 12, § 254; VAN 
SANTVOORD, supra note 21, at 148–49; 1 VICTOR B. WOOLLEY, PRACTICE IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS 
IN THE LAW COURTS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE § 343, at 247 (1906). 
 33. See, e.g., 2 CHITTY, supra note 2, at 429 (H. Greening et al. eds., Springfield, Mass., G. & C. Merriam, 
7th Eng. ed. & 16th Am. ed. 1872) (citing English and American common-law pleading cases regarding 
incorporation by reference). 
 34. See Letter from David Dudley Field to John O’Sullivan (Jan. 1, 1842), in 5 DOCUMENTS OF THE 
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK, 64TH SESS. 23–62 (1842). The letter was published as Appendix to the 
Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, in Relation to the More Simple and Speedy Administration of Justice 
and described proposed pleading rules. Id.; see also ARPHAXED LOOMIS, HISTORIC SKETCH OF THE NEW YORK 
SYSTEM OF LAW REFORM IN PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS 25–27 (Little Falls, N.Y., J.R. & G.G. Stebbins 1879) 
(“[The code] was designed to abolish all forms and technicalities which obstruct justice and prevent a speedy 
trial on the merits . . . .”). Loomis was one of the members of the commission who drafted the Field Code, 
together with David Dudley Field and David Graham. Id. at 13–15. 
 35. See JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 12, § 1.6, at 19. 
 36. See LOOMIS, supra note 34, at 25–26 (“The system approaches and assimilates more nearly with the 
equity forms than with those of the common law.”). 
 37. See infra Subpart IV.A. 
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Instead, the old dogma persisted unchallenged. It was later maintained in 
the New York Throop Code of 1877, which provided that where a complaint 
“sets forth two or more causes of action, the statement of the facts constituting 
each cause of action must be separate and numbered.”38 The same rule was 
applicable for defendants asserting more than one defense or counterclaim.39 
Again, the rule that each cause of action must be “separately stated” had the 
same common-law interpretation that each count must be complete, containing 
all facts and elements of the cause of action. After all, that was the only reality 
that the practitioners knew at the time, and new statutes are interpreted and 
applied in the context of the time in which they are inserted. 
The rule then continued in the New York Rules of Civil Practice of 1921: 
“Each separate cause of action, counterclaim or defense shall be separately 
stated and numbered, and shall be divided into paragraphs numbered 
consecutively, each as nearly as may be containing a separate allegation.”40 The 
rule, however, adopted a different regulation for denials of facts: “Denials of 
facts alleged in the complaint or in an answer and denied by reply must not be 
repeated nor incorporated in a separate defense or counterclaim. Any fact once 
denied, shall be deemed denied for all purposes of the pleading.”41 
The text did not change much in 1962, when the New York Civil Practice 
Law and Rules were enacted: “Separate causes of action or defenses shall be 
separately stated and numbered.”42 But by then, the phrase “separately stated” 
did not carry the meaning that each count had to contain all facts and elements 
essential to the cause of action even if previously mentioned in the same 
pleading. Actually, the opposite was true.43 
Incidentally, the 1938 Federal Rules also contain a similar provision 
regarding claims being “separately stated.” But it is couched in a much more 
tentative language: “If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a 
separate transaction or occurrence—and each defense other than a denial—must 
be stated in a separate count or defense.”44 It is still true today that each 
paragraph must be numbered, each paragraph must be limited to a single set of 
circumstances, and each claim must be stated in separate counts.45 But the 
dogma of complete counts was never adopted in the Federal Rules.46 
 
 38. N.Y. CODE CIV. PROC. § 483 (1877) (emphasis omitted). At the time, the law demanded that the counts 
be numbered. Now, each paragraph in a pleading must be numbered. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b) (“A party must 
state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of 
circumstances.”). 
 39. N.Y. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 507, 517; see also infra Subpart II.C. 
 40. N.Y. R. CIV. PRAC. § 90 (1921). 
 41. Id. 
 42. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3014 (McKinney 1962). 
 43. See infra Subpart IV.B. 
 44. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b) (1938). 
 45. But see 2 PARNESS, supra note 4, § 10.03 (these rules are not rigidly enforced if their violation does 
not confuse the opponent); 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, §§ 1322–24 (2018) (same). 
 46. See infra Subpart IV.C. 
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The dogma, therefore, has been dead in this country for almost a century 
(at least more than eighty years in the federal courts, and more than fifty in New 
York). But its disappearance went largely unnoticed to the legal profession. 
Because we neglected to give it a proper burial, its ghost still haunts us.47 
C. THE DOGMA APPLIED TO DEFENSES 
The dogma that required each count to be complete was applied with the 
same force to responsive pleadings asserting more than one defense (plea) or 
more than one counterclaim. Each defense or counterclaim had to be “separately 
stated” and therefore complete: each had to contain all elements of that defense 
and be able to stand by itself, unaided by other defenses in the same answer. 
This was the rule in English common-law pleading,48 in American 
common-law pleading,49 and in American code pleading.50 So everything said 
 
 47. This is an inept attempt to paraphrase Maitland. F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY ALSO THE FORMS OF 
ACTIONS AT COMMON LAW 296 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1910) (“The forms of actions we have 
buried, but they still rule us from their graves.”). American law’s disorderly development through case law is 
breading grounds for a herd of ghosts, zombies, and undead. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Indispensable 
Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1254 (1961). 
 48. See Stiles v. Nokes (1806) 103 Eng. Rep. 191, 196; 7 East 493, 507; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 
18, at 99. 
 49. See Currie v. Henry, 2 Johns. 433, 437 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807); Hughes v. Moore, 11 U.S. 176, 190 
(1812); Day v. Clarke's Adm'r, 8 Ky. 521, 522 (1819); Griswold v. Nat’l Ins. Co., 3 Cow. 96, 113 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1824) (stating that “[e]ach plea [defense] must stand upon itself. One plea [defense] cannot be invoked in aid 
of another” and transcribing a defense containing incorporation by reference) (citation omitted)); Shook v. 
Fulton, 4 Cow. 424, 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825); see also 1 WILLIAM W. HENING, THE AMERICAN PLEADER AND 
LAWYER’S GUIDE 33–38 (New York, Isaac Riley 1811); GOULD, supra note 13, at 171. 
 50. See Bridge v. Payson, 5 Sand. 210 (1851); Benedict v. Seymour, 6 How. Pr. 298, 303 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1852) (“[E]very denial . . . must stand by itself as a separate and distinct defence [sic] and must be so pleaded.”); 
Williams v. Richmond, 9 How. Pr. 522, 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854) (discussing a defense referring to a promissory 
note mentioned in the complaint); Spencer v. Babcock, 22 Barb. 326, 335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856) (“A defense 
cannot be made out in pleading, by connecting two or more separate defenses together . . . each insufficient of 
itself.”); Swift v. Kingsley, 24 Barb. 541, 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857) (“Each answer must stand by itself as a 
distinct defense . . . .”); Xenia Branch Bank v. Lee, 7 Abb. Pr. 372, 386 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858) (“Each defence 
[sic] so separately pleaded must be in itself complete, and must contain all that is necessary to answer the whole 
cause of action, or to answer that part thereof which it purports to answer.”); Catlin v. Pedrick, 17 Wis. 88, 92 
(1863); Baldwin v. U.S. Tel. Co., 54 Barb. 505, 517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867) (“By the well settled rules of pleading, 
each answer must of itself be a complete answer to the whole complaint; as perfectly so as if it stood alone. 
Unless, in terms, it adopts or refers to the matter contained in some other answer, it must be tested, as a pleading, 
alone by the matter itself contains.”); Nat’l Bank of Mich. v. Green, 33 Iowa 140, 144 (1871); Krutz v. Fisher, 
8 Kan. 90, 96–97 (1871); Truitt v. Baird, 12 Kan. 420, 423–24 (1874); Field v. Burton, 71 Ind. 380, 387 (1880); 
Spahr v. Tartt, 23 Ill. App. 420, 421 (1887); Eldridge v. Hargreaves, 46 N.W. 923, 924 (Neb. 1890); Black v. 
Holloway, 41 S.W. 576, 576 (Ky. Ct. App. 1897); Corbey v. Rogers, 52 N.E. 748, 749–50 (Ind. 1899); Eureka 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 57 N.E. 57, 59 (Ohio 1900); Gardner v. McWilliams, 42 Or. 14 (1902); 
Smith v. Martin, 94 Or. 132 (1919); see also POMEROY, supra note 20, §§ 715–16, at 736 (“[E]ach [defense] 
must of itself be a complete answer to the whole cause of action against which it is directed, as perfectly so as 
though it were pleaded alone.”); T. A. GREEN, A GENERAL TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN CIVIL 
PROCEEDINGS AT LAW AND IN EQUITY UNDER THE CODE SYSTEM §§ 825, 848–49 (WM. G. Myer ed., St. Louis, 
Mo., W.J. Gilbert 1879); 1 WILLIAM RUMSEY, THE PRACTICE IN ACTIONS AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE 
COURTS OF RECORD OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 355 (Albany, N.Y., 
Banks & Bros. 1887); 1 ABBOTT & ALDEN, supra note 23, at 7, 16; 16 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PLEADING AND 
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in this Article about a plaintiff’s complaint is equally applicable to a defendant’s 
answer and counterclaim. 
D.  CONSEQUENCES FOR DISREGARDING THE DOGMA 
Although the dogma of complete counts seems a frivolous technicality for 
modern legal minds, violating this fundamental pleading rule led to severe 
consequences: incomplete claims (or defenses) could be stricken or dismissed 
for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action (or defense).51 
And the arcane rule was rigidly applied because pleadings were strictly 
construed against the pleader.52  
 
PRACTICE 561–62 (William M. McKinney ed., Long Island, N.Y., Edward Thompson Co. 1899); see also N.Y. 
FIELD CODE PROC. § 150 (1848) (amended 1849) (“[Defenses] shall each be separately stated, and refer to the 
causes of action which they are intended to answer, in any manner by which they may be intelligibly 
distinguished.”); N.Y. THROOP CODE CIV. PROC. § 507 (1877) (same); N.Y. R. CIV. PRAC. § 90 (1920) (same). 
 51. See, e.g., the defenses filed in Tindall v. Moore (1760) 95 Eng. Rep. 716, 716; 2 Wils. KB 114 (old 
motion in arrest of judgment); Nelson v. Swan, 13 Johns. 483, 484 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816) (demurrer); Crookshank 
v. Gray, 20 Johns. 344, 344–48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823) (incomplete count is not actionable); Porter v. Cumings, 7 
Wend. 172, 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1831) (motion to set aside the verdict); Nestle v. Van Slyck, 2 Hill 282, 284–85 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (motion for nonsuit); Hitchcock v. Munger, 15 N.H. 97, 102 (1844) (motion in arrest of 
judgment); Sinclair v. Fitch, 3 E.D. Smith 677, 685 (N.Y. Ct. Com. P. 1857) (direct judgment based on 
demurrer); Xenia Branch Bank, 7 Abb. at 394–95 (motion to strike out a counterclaim from an answer); Gilmore 
v. Christ Hosp., 52 A. 241, 242 (N.J. 1902) (demurrer); Richardson v. Lanning, 26 N.J.L. 130, 132 (1856) 
(nonsuit); Abendroth v. Boardley, 27 Wis. 555, 556 (1871) (demurrer); Entsminger v. Jackson, 73 Ind. 144, 146 
(1880) (demurrer); St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. City of St. Louis, 86 Mo. 495, 498 (1885) (objection to the 
introduction of evidence); Ronnie v. Ryder, 8 N.Y.S. 5, 6 (City Ct. 1889) (motion for a new trial); Woods v. 
Armstrong, 29 Misc. 660, 661 (N.Y. Special Term 1899) (motion to vacate the execution); Opdycke v. Easton 
& Amboy R.R. Co., 68 N.J.L. 12, 13 (1902) (demurrer); Henry v. Milner, 204 Ala. 226, 227 (1920) (demurrer 
granted after verdict for plaintiff). 
 52. See, e.g., Took v. Glascock (1666) 85 Eng. Rep. 298, 305–06 & n.8; 1 Wms. Saun. 250, 259 & n.8 
(“[I]t is a maxim in pleading, that every thing shall be taken most strongly against the pleader.”); De Symonds 
v. Shedden (1800) 126 Eng. Rep. 1209, 1211; 2 Box. & Pul. 153, 155 (“[T]he rule has been established ever 
since the time of Plowden [sixteenth century] that the intendment is against the party averring.”); Griswold, 3 
Cow. at 103 (“[E]very pleading is to be taken most strongly against the pleader.”); see also 4 BACON, supra note 
20, at 2; Francis Bacon, The Maxims of the Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF LORD BACON 552 (London, William Ball 
1838) (“[I]n all imperfections of pleading, whether it be in ambiguity of words and double intendments, or want 
of certainty and averments, or impropriety of words, or repugnancy and absurdity of words, even the plea shall 
be strictly and strongly taken against him that pleads.”); LAWES, supra note 12, at 52; 1 CHITTY, supra note 2, 
at 241, 520–21 (noting that claims are strongly construed against the pleading party); 2 COKE, supra note 13, 
§ 534[p], at 303.b. (“[T]he plea of every man shall be construed strongly against him that pleadeth it, for everie 
[sic] man is presumed to make the best of his owne [sic] case: ambiguum placitum interpretari debet contra 
proferentem.”); 1 EDMUND PLOWDEN, THE COMMENTARIES OR REPORTS OF EDMUND PLOWDEN 29–30, 46, 103–
04 (Samuel Richardson trans., Savoy, Catharine Lintot 1761) (1578) (“[A] plea[] . . . shall be taken most strongly 
against him that pleads them . . . .”); STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 379; 1 SAUNDERS, supra note 12, at 416; 1 
ESTEE, supra note 20, at 159.  
  The opposite of a rule of construction strictly against the pleader is that a pleading “shall be liberally 
construed, with a view of substantial justice between the parties.” Childers v. Verner & Stribling, 12 S.C. 1, 5 
(1878) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted); see also CARLOS C. ALDEN, A HANDBOOK OF 
PRACTICE UNDER THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT OF NEW YORK 62–63 (1921) (“At common law the rule of strict 
construction was applied, against the pleading. Under the present statute, defects in substance cannot be 
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In several cases, this superstition was taken to the extreme: the incomplete 
claim could not be amended and would be dismissed for failure to state a claim, 
or a jury verdict favorable to the plaintiff would be set aside on appeal.53 The 
times were indeed hostile to common sense. A party risked losing a substantive 
right because of a technically defective pleading. Common-law judges were 
known for treating trivial procedural and formal errors as fatal to the 
proceeding;54 and some of this rigidity was carried over to the nineteenth-
century practice of code pleading.55 
Several courts, however, exercised their discretion to allow plaintiffs and 
defendants to amend their pleadings, within a certain time, to add the omitted 
information in a count or defense, generally with payment of costs. This was 
true even during the more formalistic common-law pleading.56 Despite its 
formalism and contrary to general misconception, amendments were generously 
 
overlooked or omissions supplied . . . .” (citations omitted)); EDWIN BAYLIES, THE RULES OF PLEADING UNDER 
THE CODE 68–69 (Rochester, N.Y., Williamson Law Book Co. 1890); 1 RUMSEY, supra note 50, at 269–70. 
 53. See, e.g., Stiles, 103 Eng. Rep. at 194, 196 (motion to amend denied in the peculiarity of the situation); 
Crawford v. N.J. R.R. & Transp. Co., 28 N.J.L. 479, 484 (1860) (insufficient claim and motion to amend denied). 
 54. See 4 BACON, supra note 20, at B (noting that “many Miscarriages of Causes [depend] upon small and 
trivial Objections . . . .”). 
 55. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 91 (1950). 
 56. See, e.g., Nelson, 13 Johns. at 485 (allowing the plaintiff to amend his declaration); Shook v. Fulton, 4 
Cow. 424, 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825); Sayre v. Jewett, 12 Wend. 135, 136 (same) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834); see also 
ANTHON, supra note 19, § 5, at 39–40 (discussing a 1792 English case). 
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granted at common law.57 Amendments for failure to incorporate became even 
more prevalent with the more flexible code pleading.58  
 
 57. See, e.g., Trethewy v. Ellesdon (1726) 86 Eng. Rep. 356, 357; 2 Vent. 141 (early English case allowing 
amendment, on an unrelated issue, upon payment of costs); 4 BACON, supra note 20, at H3 (“[T]he judges ought 
to judge upon the Substance, and not upon the Manner or Form of Pleading.”); 1 ROBERT RICHARDSON, THE 
ATTORNEY’S PRACTICE IN THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH 170, 193 (London, His Majesty’s Law-Printers, 6th ed. 
1769); 2 WILLIAM TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING’S BENCH AND COMMON PLEAS IN PERSONAL 
ACTIONS AND EJECTMENT 632–33 (London, A. Strahan 1799); STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 97–98 (“[U]ntil the 
judgment is signed, . . . either party is, in general, at liberty to amend his pleading as at common law; the leave 
to do which, is granted as of course, upon proper and reasonable terms, including the payment of the costs of the 
application, and sometimes the whole costs of the cause up to that time. And, even after the judgment is signed, 
and up to the latest period of the action, amendment is, in most cases, allowable at the discretion of the 
Court . . . .” (emphasis and footnotes omitted)); ABRAHAM CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAW SUIT § 36, at 27 
(Nashville, Tenn., W. F. Bang & Co., 2d ed. 1856) (“If upon demurrer . . . or at any other time before or 
afterwards, at any stage in the progress of the suit, the plaintiff discovers any defect in his declaration, writ or 
any other proceeding, he may apply to the Court for leave to amend it. . . . [and] any defect in fine, whether of 
form or substance, may be amended.”); WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 93–96; FRANKLIN FISKE HEARD, 
PRECEDENTS OF PLEADINGS IN PERSONAL ACTIONS IN THE SUPERIOR COURTS OF COMMON LAW 30–31 (Boston, 
Little, Brown & Co. 1886) (“There is no kind of error or mistake which, if not fraudulent or intended to 
overreach, the court ought not to correct, if it can be done without injustice to the other party. The present rule, 
which follows previous legislation on the subject, is that ‘All such amendments shall be made as may be 
necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties.’ As soon as it 
appears that the way in which a party has framed his case will not lead to a decision of the real matter in 
controversy, it is as much a matter of right on his part to have it corrected, if it can be done without injustice, as 
anything else in the case is a matter of right.”).  
  Amendments were common at early common law, especially when the pleadings were oral. With 
written pleadings, amendments became more restricted and had to be expanded by the statutes of jeofails, not 
by common-law precedents. See Townsend v. Jemison, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 706, 718 (1849) (discussing the statute 
of jeofails). The level of flexibility, therefore, varied over the centuries and according to the phase of the 
proceeding. 
 58. See, e.g., Landau v. Levy, 1 Abb. Pr. 376, 380 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855); Sinclair v. Fitch, 3 E.D. Smith 
677, 691 (N.Y. Ct. Com. P. 1857); Xenia Branch Bank v. Lee, 7 Abb. Pr. 372, 388, 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858); 
Simmons v. Fairchild, 42 Barb. 404, 411 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1864); Baldwin v. U.S. Tel. Co., 54 Barb. 505, 519 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867); Stewart v. Balderston, 10 Kan. 131, 149 (1872); Silvers v. Junction R.R. Co., 43 Ind. 435, 
447 (1873); McCarnan v. Cochran, 57 Ind. 166, 169–70 (1877); Anderson v. Speers, 8 Abb. N. Cas. 382, 383 
(N.Y. 1879); Reiners v. Brandhorst, 59 How. Pr. 91, 92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1879); Haskell v. Haskell, 54 Cal. 262, 
265 (1880); Ronnie v. Ryder, 8 N.Y.S. 5, 6 (City Ct. 1889); Weber v. Squier, 51 Mo. App. 601, 605 (1892); 
McKay v. McDougal, 48 P. 988, 992 (Mont. 1897); Hopkins v. Contra Costa Cty., 39 P. 933, 935 (Cal. 1895); 
Cooper v. Robert Portner Brewing Co., 38 S.E. 91, 93 (Ga. 1901) (“The motion to dismiss should have been 
sustained as to the second and third counts, unless these counts were amended so as to set forth a complete cause 
of action . . . .”); Wallace v. Jones, 74 N.Y.S. 116, 116–17 (App. Div. 1902); Marietta v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, 
Chi. & St. Louis Ry. Co., 100 N.Y.S. 1027, 1028 (Sup. Ct. 1906); Deddrick v. Mallery, 143 A.D. 819, 821 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1911); Schrade v. Camillus Cutlery Co., 242 F. 523, 526 (N.D.N.Y. 1917); Liebster v. Friedman, 180 
N.Y.S. 322, 323 (App. Div. 1920); Smith v. Phila., Balt. & Wash. R.R. Co., 115 A. 416, 418 (Del. 1921); James 
Rees & Sons Co. v. Angel, 211 N.Y.S. 817, 819 (1925); Levine v. Schaffzin, 99 N.Y.S.2d 254, 255 (1950); 
Latman v. Kalmor Builders, Inc., 137 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241 (Sup. Ct. 1954), Latman v. Kalmor Builders, Inc., 138 
N.Y.S.2d 145, 147 (App. Div. 1955); see also N.Y. CODE PROC. §§ 172–74 (1848) (providing flexible 
amendment rules); N.Y. THROOP CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 497, 542, 723–24, 783 (1877) (same); N.Y. R. CIV. P. 
§ 244 (1920) (same); 1 HENRY WHITTAKER, PRACTICE AND PLEADING UNDER THE CODE § 126 (New York, E.O. 
Jenkins 2d rev. ed. 1854); 1 RUMSEY, supra note 50, at 282–89; 1 KINKEAD, supra note 16, § 126, at 119; CLARK, 
supra note 4, at § 113 (discussing flexible amendment rules in code pleading “at any time in furtherance of 
justice and on such terms as may be proper”). 
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Indeed, both in common-law and in code pleading, many pleading battles 
were mostly paper battles. They would not have happened if the plaintiff (or 
defendant) had simply amended his or her complaint (or defense) instead of 
fighting the opponent’s challenge. For example, a 1908 court excoriated an 
intervener: 
It may pertinently be suggested that the respondent intervener might have saved 
himself some trouble and expense if, when the motion was made to strike out his 
second cause of action or defense, he had amended said second count by inserting 
therein averments covering the point upon which we feel constrained to reverse 
the judgment.59 
An 1889 case about an imperfect reference held that a trial court could 
disregard immaterial errors that did not surprise or prejudice a party and could 
allow amendment of the complaint.60  
With time, failure to comply with the dogma of complete counts was not 
dealt with by a motion to dismiss anymore, but by a “motion to correct,” or a 
“motion to make a pleading more definite and certain” or a “motion to separately 
state and number.”61 Moreover, starting around the end of the nineteenth 
century, if the opposing party did not object to an incomplete count the defect 
was waived.62 
 
 59. Cameron v. Ah Quong, 96 P. 1025, 1027 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908); see also Aull Sav. Bank v. City of 
Lexington, 74 Mo. 104, 105–06 (1881) (plaintiff refused to amend and final judgment was rendered for the 
defendant, later reversed); Gardner v. McWilliams, 69 P. 915, 915 (Or. 1902) (defendant declined to amend his 
answer and the second count was stricken); Dailey v. O’Brien, 96 S.W. 521, 522 (Ky. Ct. App. 1906) (plaintiffs 
were granted leave to amend but preferred to stand by their petition and lost the case). 
 60. Ronnie, 8 N.Y.S. at 6 (1889). Ronnie cited § 723 of the 1877 NY Throop Code of Civil Procedure, 
which provides in part,  
The court may . . . at any other stage of the action, before or after judgment, in furtherance of justice, 
and on such terms as it deems just, amend any . . . pleading . . . by correcting a mistake in any other 
respect, or by inserting an allegation material to the case; or, where the amendment does not change 
substantially the claim or defence [sic], by conforming the pleading . . . to the facts proved. And, in 
every stage of the action, the court must disregard an error or defect, in the pleadings or other 
proceedings, which does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party. 
See N.Y. CODE CIV. PROC. § 723. A similar provision existed in the Field Code. See N.Y. CODE PROC. §§ 173, 
176; see also Orr v. Russell, 231 S.W. 275, 276 (1921) (“The court shall, in every stage of the action, disregard 
any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect the substantial rights of the adverse 
party . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)); MONTGOMERY H. THROOP, THE CODE OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 309 (1892) (“The only limit to the power to amend pleadings upon the trial is that a new cause 
of action must not be introduced.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Leavenworth, N. & S. Ry. Co. v. Wilkins, 26 P. 16, 16–17 (Kan. 1891) (motion to separately 
state and number); see also POMEROY, supra note 20, § 716, at 737 & n.1 (motion to correct); 1 RUMSEY, supra 
note 50, at 257, 384 (not ground for demurrer); 1 NICHOLS, supra note 23, at 926–27 (motion to make more 
definite and certain, not demurrer). 
 62. See Orr, 231 S.W. at 276 (“The court shall, in every stage of the action, disregard any error or defect 
in the pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party . . . .” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)); Shook v. Fulton, 4 Cow. 424, 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825) (explaining 
that a party cannot entrap the opponent and that if the party considered a pleading in bad form, it should have 
challenged it earlier when the opponent still could have amended the pleading); Truitt v. Baird, 12 Kan. 420, 
423–24 (1874); St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. City of St. Louis, 86 Mo. 495, 498 (1885); Eaton v. Or. Ry. & 
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With time, therefore, the violation of the dogma became more an 
inconvenience to the parties than sanctionable conduct and had no serious 
adverse consequences for the merits of the claim. In some cases, it was merely 
a pleading battle between the attorneys.   
Little has changed in the past century. It is unthinkable that a contemporary 
judge would strike or dismiss a claim (or that a court of appeals would reverse a 
favorable verdict) solely because a count did not incorporate facts previously 
stated in the same pleading. First, the proper procedural remedy for a failure to 
incorporate is not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a more definite 
statement.63 The motion will be granted only if the pleading is “so vague or 
ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.”64 Second, 
amendment is widely available for failure to incorporate.65 Third, if a party does 
not object to an opponent’s failure to incorporate, that defense is waived.66 
Finally, no pleading imperfection may affect the substantive rights of the parties 
absent prejudice to the opponent.67 
A prestigious federal practice treatise argues, wrongly, that “when 
appropriate, an objection to an incorporation by reference can be made by a 
motion to strike, a motion for a more definite statement, or a motion to dismiss 
 
Navigation Co., 24 P. 415, 415 (1890) (“Defects of this character should be pointed out before answering and 
going to trial; otherwise, when the defects complained of are supplied by the answer, and the defendant is content 
to go to trial, he will be precluded from raising them.”); Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chi. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Rice, 
48 Ill. App. 51, 55 (1891); Aulbach v. Dahler, 43 P. 322, 324 (Idaho 1896) (discussing nonprejudicial errors); 
see also POMEROY, supra note 20, § 716, at 737 & n.1; WILLIAM MCKINNEY, 16 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 562 note 1. See generally 1 WHITTAKER, supra note 58, § 113, at 334 (formal defects 
are waivable); PHILLIPS, supra note 12, §§ 287–88 (same); 1 NICHOLS, supra note 23, at 342 (Supp. 1914) (“The 
objection that separate causes of actions are not separately stated and numbered is waived unless presented 
before trial of the action.”). 
 63. See Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366–67 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that a defendant faced with “shotgun pleading” is expected to move for more definite statement, but 
“the [trial] court, acting sua sponte, should have struck the plaintiff's complaint, and the defendants’ answer, and 
instructed plaintiff's counsel to file a more definite statement”). 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) (amended 1948) (“A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading 
to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably 
prepare a response.” (emphasis added)). See generally 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1322 (“Because 
the motion to direct a party to paragraph a pleading properly often is employed only as a dilatory tactic, a district 
court should direct a pleader to paragraph only when the existing form of the pleading is prejudicial or renders 
the framing of an appropriate response extremely difficult or would be of assistance to the district judge.”). 
 65. See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1326 (2018) (“Leave to amend the pleading to correct a 
defective incorporation should be granted liberally.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely 
give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”). 
 66. See generally 5 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE: CPLR ¶ 3014.02 (David L. 
Ferstendig ed., 2019) (“Service of a responsive pleading normally waives any defects in form in the earlier 
pleading.”); id. ¶ 3014.10 (“If a responsive pleading has been served, the party serving it normally should be 
considered to have waived his right to object to failure to state and number separately.”); 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, 
supra note 4, § 1322 (“A failure to object to improper paragraphing promptly—normally before interposing a 
responsive pleading—properly has been deemed a waiver of the defect by at least one court of appeals.”). 
 67. See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 384, 392 (1949) (“We no longer insist upon 
technical rules of pleading . . . .”). 
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for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”68 The magic phrase 
“when appropriate” makes every assertion right twice a day, like a broken clock: 
of course cases will be dismissed “when appropriate.” Still, it is wrong to say 
that motions to strike or to dismiss are available to challenge a defective 
incorporation.69 
This text is a leftover from the first edition of the treatise.70 But it was 
wrong in the first edition as well because the authors cited three cases that 
directly contradicted their contention. Two cases expressly rejected the 
possibility of a motion to dismiss for failure to incorporate71 and the other case 
was dismissed (with leave to amend) because the whole complaint was 
confusing and a count was insufficient despite the incorporation.72 This 
comment, in such a prestigious treatise, scared four generations of lawyers into 
complying with a ghost obligation. 
III.  THE EXCEPTION TO THE DOGMA  
(PERMISSION TO INCORPORATE BY REFERENCE) 
A.  INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE IN COMMON-LAW AND CODE PLEADING 
But the dogma could not be strictly applied in practice. Demanding 
pleaders to repeat all relevant facts and elements in each count would lead to 
unnecessarily repetitive pleadings. This repetition would violate the traditional 
principle of common-law pleading in England and in the United States, which 
encouraged conciseness and shunned repetition.73 This principle was codified in 
all state codes of civil procedure enacted in the United States after 1848.74 For 
example, all New York codes of civil procedure contained express language 
 
 68. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1326 (2018). 
 69. See, e.g., Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284–85 (11th Cir. 2001) (the appropriate disposition of 
a complaint that disregarded pleading rules is not to dismiss the claim for failure to state a claim). 
 70. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1326 (1969). 
 71. Rosenberg v. Cohen, 9 F.R.D. 328, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1949) (rejecting a motion to dismiss for failure to 
incorporate and arguing that “[i]t is by now a familiar rule that a complaint cannot be dismissed ‘except where 
it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be 
proved in support of the claim’” (quoting Cont’l Collieries, Inc. v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631, 635 (3d Cir. 1942)); 
Heintz & Co., Inc. v. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 29 F.R.D. 144, 145, 146 (1961) (rejecting a 
motion to dismiss despite a “fatally obscure” complaint because the failure could be cured by amendment and a 
more definite statement). 
 72. Baird v. Dassau, 1 F.R.D. 275, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (“The sixth cause of action does not set forth a 
single new fact, but merely incorporates eleven paragraphs previously pleaded in the other causes of action, 
many of which contain the same defects hereinabove discussed.”). 
 73. See, e.g., LAWES, supra note 12, at 60 (“As nothing is more desirable to the court than precision, nothing 
is more so for the parties than brevity.”); 1 CHITTY, supra note 2, at 330 (“[F]or it is a general rule in pleading, 
that where any matter tends to great prolixity, a concise manner of pleading it may be admitted . . . .”); 1 
SAUNDERS, supra note 12, at 417; 1 TIDD, supra note 57, at 536 (“[I]f a declaration be unnecessarily long, the 
court will expunge the superfluous matter . . . .”). 
 74. See, e.g., BLISS, supra note 13, § 318, at 365; PHILLIPS, supra note 12, § 193, at 174; 1 WILLIAM A. 
SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON CODE PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 91, at 75 (1910). 
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requiring the statements of facts on a pleading to be concise, without 
unnecessary repetition.75 
To avoid repetition, therefore, the old English common-law pleading 
developed an exception to the dogma requiring that all counts contain a complete 
statement of the cause of action: a pleader could incorporate previous allegations 
from one count to another. 
Incorporation by reference has enjoyed unbroken authority in common-law 
and code pleadings for more than four centuries. It is a mistake, therefore, to say 
that it is a recent technique designed to avoid the repetition and redundancy 
characteristic of the old common-law pleading. In 1938, for example, after the 
Federal Rules were enacted, James Moore welcomed Rule 10(c) and 
incorporation by reference, stating that “the older point of view reflected the 
common law notion that [incorporation by] reference is not effective.”76 
Moore’s error continued in the 1993 edition: “[incorporation by reference] 
eliminates the repetition and redundancy which prevailed under the common-
law practice where such references were not permitted.”77 This is just one of the 
several misconceptions related to common-law pleading. 
B.  INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE IN ENGLAND 
The earliest known precedent of incorporation by reference in England is 
Barnes v. May, an action of assumpsit from the courts of the Queen’s Bench 
decided around 1591.78 The conflict was about the sale of two packs of wool. 
On the first count, about the first pack, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
had not paid the purchase price on a specific day and place. On the second count, 
about the second pack, the plaintiff failed to allege the day and place of payment 
but referred to the first count. Although the day and place of payment was an 
essential element of the second count, the court held that the reference to the first 
count was sufficient.79 This precedent, now forgotten, was widely cited 
throughout the nineteenth century.80 
 
 75. N.Y. CODE PROC. § 120(2) (1848) (amended 1851) (“The complaint shall contain . . . A statement of 
the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, . . . .”); id. 
§ 142(2) (amended 1851) (“The complaint shall contain . . . [a] plain and concise statement of the facts 
constituting a cause of action without unnecessary repetition.”); N.Y. CODE CIV. PROC. § 481(2) (1877) (“The 
complaint must contain . . . [a] plain and concise statement of the facts, constituting each cause of action, without 
unnecessary repetition.” (emphasis omitted)); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 241 (1920) (“Every pleading shall contain 
a plain and concise statement of the material facts, without unnecessary repetition . . . .”). 
 76. 1 JAMES W. MOORE & JOSEPH FRIEDMAN, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 10.03 (1938); see also 
Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 561 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (“The adoption by reference technique is designed 
to avoid the repetition and redundancy characteristic of the common law system of pleading.”). 
 77. 2A JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 10.05 (2d ed. 1993). 
 78. (1591) 78 Eng. Rep. 496; Cro. Eliz. 240. 
 79. Id. at 496. 
 80. Joseph Chitty seems to have been the first who cited Barnes. See 1 CHITTY, supra note 2, at 397. He 
was presumably aided by the publication of the fourth edition of the Croke’s Reports in 1790 (Cro. Eliz.), a 
couple of decades before the first edition of his celebrated treatise. 
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The exception, then, seems to have been born together with the dogma. 
One can find no earlier case stating the dogma without the exception. The dogma 
can only be found on cases allowing its exception. This may be an indication 
that the dogma of complete counts was born a mistake. 
Barnes was pleaded and recorded in Latin, handwritten on a roll of 
parchment, during Queen Elizabeth I’s reign.81 It was then selected and reported 
(in summary) in Law French by Sir George Croke for his personal use. Croke’s 
Report was published posthumously in 1657, seventy years after Barnes was 
decided, translated into English by Sir Harbottle Grimston, his son-in-law. For 
this Article, I used the third edition of Croke’s Report, of 1683.82 Below is the 
full content of Croke’s summary: 
Barnes versus May 
Assumpsit. That whereas he sold to the Defendant a pack of wooll [sic] 
for twenty pound, to be paid at a day certain, and licèt requisi- 
tus, viz. at such a day and place, etc. he had not paid it; and that he 
sold to the Defendant another Pack of Wooll [sic] for ten pound to be 
paid when required, Et licèt similiter requisitus, &c. without alledging [sic] 
day and place, yet adjudged good, for it shall refer to the first day  
and place of request.83 
 The summary is cryptic because it was written for Judge Croke’s personal 
use, not for publication. The original record certainly contains the pleadings and 
a full decision, and may reveal more information about the case. 
 A professional researcher was hired to locate the full text of Barnes but 
failed,84 likely because the old English law reports are unreliable (it is still 
disappointing because the Croke Reports are authoritative).85 To show the 
antiquity of this pleading tradition, the text of a contemporaneous case86 and the 
cover page of the Queen’s Bench roll starting regnal year 1591, with a stylized 
colored image of Queen Elizabeth I, is attached.87 
 
 81. After a 1731 statute, pleadings and court records in England were written in English. See 12 WILLIAM 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 213–14, 359 (1938). 
 82. THE REPORTS OF SIR GEORGE CROKE (Sir Harbottle Grimston trans., 3d ed. 1683) (1657) [hereinafter 
REPORTS OF SIR GEORGE CROKE] (published in three volumes). 
 83. Id. at 240.  
 84. Duncan Harrington searched the whole regnal year representing Term 33 Elizabeth of the Queen’s 
Bench (KB 27/1316-1319) using the docket books. Further searches were then made in the docket books for 
Hilary and Trinity 32 Elizabeth. See Historical Research, HIST. RES., http://www.historyresearch.co.uk (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2019). 
 85. See, e.g., JOHN WILLIAM WALLACE, THE REPORTERS, CHRONOLOGICALLY ARRANGED: WITH 
OCCASIONAL REMARKS UPON THEIR RESPECTIVE MERITS 143–49 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson, 3d ed. rev. 
1855); Van Vechten Veeder, The English Reports, 1292–1865, 15 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1901). 
 86. Elsden v. Barnes, 78 Eng. Rep. 495, 495 (1591). Elsden was summarized on the same page of the Croke 
Report as Barnes v. May, allegedly decided on the same year and by the same court. 1 REPORTS OF SIR GEORGE 
CROKE, supra note 82, at 240. 
 87. Translation by Duncan Harrington: “Pleas before the Lady Queen at Westminster Hilary Term the 
thirty second year of the reign of our Lady Elizabeth, by the grace of God of England France and Ireland Queen, 
defender of the faith etc.” 
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Someone with Latin and paleographical skills may extend the research 
through the millions of original plea rolls in The National Archives near London, 
which contains about seventy million cases, and find earlier or contemporaneous 
cases on incorporation by reference.88 The research might hit a wall around the 
late fifteenth century, as earlier pleading practice was oral.89 The research may 
lead all the way back a millennium to Roman law, when a plaintiff could not 
join claims, but the court could consolidate proceedings.90 
No other case was found in the English Reports dealing with incorporation 
by reference in the century and a half after Barnes. Yet it is reasonable to assume 
that the practice continued uninterrupted in English common-law pleading. A 
handful of cases were decided towards the end of the eighteenth century.91 And 
the literature of the early nineteenth century confirmed the practice.92 
As discussed below, however, England abandoned the dogma of complete 
counts and abolished incorporation by reference in 1852.93 
C.  INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
From the old continent, the practice of incorporation by reference naturally 
spread to the United States where it was common practice from the eighteenth 
to the twentieth centuries. The evidence in the United States is even more robust 
than in England because the practice was abolished in England in 1852,94 
whereas in the United States it continued uninterrupted well into modern 
procedure. Incorporation by reference was common in the United States for two 
centuries of common-law pleading. 
There is no American case on incorporation by reference from the 
eighteenth century because most court decisions at the time were delivered 
orally: there were no published colonial reports and few in the first decades after 
independence.95 But it is reasonable to infer that the practice was also common 
 
 88. See ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION, http://aalt.law.uh.edu/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) 
(containing the photos of millions original plea rolls from the National Archives). 
 89. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 293 (Oxford, Eng., 
Clarendon Press 1768) (stating that in the past the pleadings were put by the lawyers orally in court and then 
minuted down by the clerks or protonotaries); THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE 
COMMON LAW 339–407 (5th ed. 1956). 
 90. See Robert Wyness Millar, Joinder of Actions in Continental Civil Procedure, 28 ILL. L. REV. 26, 31–
34 (1933). 
 91. See Tindall v. Moore (1760) 95 Eng. Rep. 716; 2 Wils. KB 114; Baldwin v. Elphinston (1775) 96 Eng. 
Rep. 610; 2 Black W. 1037; Phillips v. Fielding (1792) 126 Eng. Rep. 464; 2 H. Bl. 123; Mors v. Thacker (1793) 
83 Eng. Rep. 514; 2 Lev. 193;83 ER 514; Stiles v. Nokes (1806) 103 Eng. Rep. 191, 194; 7 East 493, 502, 506. 
 92. See, e.g., 1 CHITTY, supra note 2, at 396; 1 SAUNDERS, supra note 12, at 417. 
 93. See infra Subpart IV.A. 
 94. See infra Subpart IV.A. 
 95. See generally Alan V. Briceland, Ephraim Kirby: Pioneer of American Law Reporting, 1789, 16 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 297 (1972) (discussing the creation of the first law report in the United States in 1789 
Connecticut); Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall 
Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291 (1985) (discussing the creation of the Supreme Court Reports); see 
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in the 1700s in the United States. In an 1824 New York case, the attorney argued 
that repeating facts without the aid of incorporation by reference would violate 
the court’s policy and jurisprudence of encouraging concision to save expense.96 
The attorney added, “[t]his form is according to the practice of the best pleaders 
among the profession.”97 
The earliest reported American case dealing with incorporation by 
reference is a Maryland action of assumpsit from 1810.98 Incorporation by 
reference was standard practice in common-law pleading in the United States in 
most state courts in the decades that followed this case.99 It was also widely 
taught in professional textbooks published in the United States.100  
American commentators legitimized the practice and courts often 
grounded their decisions by citing English authorities, both case law and 
treatises.101 Particularly influential was Joseph Chitty’s Treatise on Pleading, the 
foremost authority on pleading in the United States for the whole nineteenth 
century.102 This reliance on English law was common at the time because 
 
also John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 571–75 
(1993) (discussing Chancellor Kent’s role in creating the first written law reports in New York after 1798). 
 96. Griswold v. Nat’l Ins. Co., 3 Cow. 96, 105 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Dent’s Adm’r v. Scott, 3 H. & J. 28, 28, 32 (Md. Ct. App. 1810). 
 99. See Nelson v. Swan, 13 Johns. 483, 485 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816); Crookshank v. Gray, 20 Johns. 344, 
344–48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823); Griswold, 3 Cow. at 116; Loomis v. Swick, 3 Wend. 205, 205–07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1829); Rathbun v. Emigh, 6 Wend. 407, 409 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1831); Porter & Clark v. Cumings, 7 Wend. 172, 
174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1831); Canterbury v. Hill, 4 Stew. & P. 224, 228 (Ala. 1833); Receivers of the Bank of New 
Brunswick v. Neilson, 15 N.J.L. 337, 338 (1836); Shultz v. Chambers, 8 Watts 300, 303 (Pa. 1839); Nestle v. 
Van Slyck, 2 Hill 282, 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842); Hitchcock v. Munger, 15 N.H. 97, 101–02 (Super. Ct. 1844); 
Mardis’ Adm’rs v. Shackleford, 6 Ala. 433, 436 (1844); Morrison v. Spears, 8 Ala. 93, 94 (1845); Freeland v. 
McCullough, 1 Denio 414, 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845); Curtis v. Belknap, 21 Vt. 426, 433 (1849); Jones v. 
Vanzandt, 13 F. Cas. 1057, 1057–58 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1851); Richardson v. Lanning, 26 N.J.L. 130, 131 (1856); 
State v. Lea, 41 Tenn. 175, 177 (1860). 
 100. See ANTHON, supra note 19, at 312; 1 CHITTY, supra note 2, at 391–92 (2d ed. 1812); 2 JAMES M. 
KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE UNDER THE PROCEDURAL CODES § 730, at 1001 
(1919); 1 KINKEAD, supra note 16, § 20; 1 JOHN LEWSON, ANNOTATED FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE AT 
COMMON LAW AS MODIFIED BY STATUTES §§ 980, 1024, 1048, 1082 (1914); SAUNDERS, supra note 12, at 417; 
SHIPMAN, supra note 12, § 254. 
 101. See Hitchcock, 15 N.H. at 97. This was a case of rare sophistication for the time, in which Justice 
Gilchrist fluently discussed several English cases and treatises including 1 CHITTY, supra note 2, at 391–92 (2d 
ed. 1812); Barnes v. May (1591) 78 Eng. Rep. 496; Tindall v. Moore (1760) 95 Eng. Rep. 716; Phillips v. 
Fielding (1792) 126 Eng. Rep. 464; Stiles v. Nokes (1806) 103 Eng. Rep. 191. But see Mardis, 6 Ala. at 436. 
Mardis is another well-researched case, in which Chief Justice Collier discussed English treatises like STEPHEN, 
supra note 12 and 1 SAUNDERS, supra note 12, but also American cases, like Dent’s Adm’r, 3 H. & J. 28. 
 102. Joseph Chitty (1775–1899) was a prominent English pleader, author of numerous professional books. 
The first edition of his treatise on pleading was published in 1809, simultaneously in London and New York. 
See 1 CHITTY, supra note 2. The last edition was probably published in 1883: the sixteenth American edition 
(adapted to American law by J.C. Perkins) based on the seventh English edition (corrected and enlarged by 
Henry Greening). For almost a century, his treatise on pleading was one of the most respected in the United 
States, followed by lawyers, cited by academics, and relied by judges. For Abraham Lincoln, the “cheapest, 
quickest, and best way” to become a lawyer was to “read Blackstone’s Commentaries, Chitty’s 
Pleadings, . . . and Story’s Equity Pleadings.” ABRAHAM LINCOLN, LETTERS AND TELEGRAMS: MEREDITH TO 
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English precedents enacted before the Declaration of Independence were 
binding in most state courts.103 
By 1848, New York had enacted its first Code of Procedure, known as the 
Field Code,104 and more than half the states followed suit. The state codes 
created a pleading system known as code pleading, as opposed to the old 
common-law pleading. Despite not being specifically prescribed in any state 
procedural code,105 incorporation by reference thrived in code pleading, both in 
federal courts and in almost all states.106 The higher number of cases in the 
 
YATES 254 (1907); see also C.S., Chitty’s Pleadings, 11 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 320, 320 (1834) (book review) 
(“This is an improved and enlarged edition of a work extensively used by the profession.”). 
 103. See generally, e.g., Frederick G. McKean, Jr., British Statutes in American Jurisdictions, 78 U. PA. L. 
REV. 195 (1929) (discussing the definition of the binding “common law of England” according to the statutes 
and precedents in the courts of several states); see also Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common 
Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 928 (1987) (“After 
1776, several states passed reception statutes that adopted the ‘common law.’ Although exactly what had been 
received is not clear, English common law procedures continued in force.” (footnote omitted)). 
 104. N.Y. CODE P. (1848). 
 105. See infra Subpart III.G.  
 106. See Benedict v. Seymour, 6 How. Pr. 298, 303 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852); Williams v. Richmond, 9 How. 
Pr. 522, 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854); Xenia Branch Bank v. Lee, 7 Abb. Pr. 372, 386–87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858); 
Crawford v. N.J. R.R. & Transp. Co., 28 N.J.L. 479, 481–82 (1860); Curtis v. Moore, 15 Wis. 134, 137–38 
(1862); Dorr v. McKinney, 9 Mass. 359, 361 (1864); Baldwin v. U.S. Tel. Co., 54 Barb. 505, 519 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1867); Beckwith v. Mollohan, 2 W. Va. 477, 481–82 (1868); Abendroth v. Boardley, 27 Wis. 555, 556 
(1871); Stewart v. Balderston, 10 Kan. 131, 145 (1872); Anderson v. Speers, 8 Abb. N. Cas. 382, 383 (N.Y. 
1879); Reiners v. Brandhorst, 59 How. Pr. 91, 92 (N.Y. 1879); Jones v. Marshall, 10 Ky. Op. 598, 599 (Ct. App. 
1880); Bricker v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 83 Mo. 391, 393 (1884); Bogardus v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 4 N.E. 522, 523–
24 (N.Y. 1886); Treweek v. Howard, 39 P. 20, 22 (Cal. 1895); St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. City of St. Louis, 86 
Mo. 495, 498 (1885); Bowler v. Bd. of Immigration, 7 Haw. 563, 567 (1889); Eaton v. Or. Ry. & Navigation 
Co., 24 P. 415, 415 (Or. 1890); Eldridge v. Hargreaves, 46 N.W. 923, 924 (Neb. 1890); Leavenworth, N. & S. 
Ry. Co. v. Wilkins, 26 P. 16, 17–18 (Kan. 1891); Dexter v. Alfred, 19 N.Y.S. 770, 771 (1892); Yost v. 
Commercial Bank of Santa Ana, 29 P. 858, 859 (Cal. 1892); Columbian Accident Co. v. Sanford, 50 Ill. App. 
424, 425 (1893); Hutson v. King, 22 S.E. 615, 616 (Ga. 1895); Hopkins v. Contra Costa County, 39 P. 933, 934 
(Cal. 1895); Aulbach v. Dahler, 43 P. 322, 323 (Idaho 1896); Yong Den v. Hitchcock, 11 Haw. 270, 271 (1898); 
Ramsey v. Johnson, 52 P. 1084, 1085 (Wyo. 1898); Realty Revenue Guar. Co. v. Farm, Stock & Home Publ’g 
Co., 82 N.W. 857, 858 (Minn. 1900); Gilmore v. Christ Hosp., 52 A. 241 (N.J. 1902); Sly v. Palo Alto Gold 
Min. Co., 68 P. 871, 871 (Wash. 1902); Wilson v. Hoffman, 123 F. 984, 986–87 (C.C.D.N.J. 1903); Bryant v. 
So. Ry. Co., 34 So. 562 (Ala. 1903); Bigelow v. Drummond, 98 A.D. 499, 501 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904); Fellows 
v. Chipman, 58 A. 663, 664 (R.I. 1904); Wolf v. Smith, 42 So. 824, 826 (Ala. 1906); Schlieder v. Wells, 114 
A.D. 417, 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 1906); Moniteau County ex rel. Bechtle v. Lewis, 123 Mo. App. 673, 676 (1907); 
Byrne Mill Co. v. Robertson, 42 So. 1008, 1010 (Ala. 1907); Chesapeake & N. Ry. Co. v. Crews, 99 S.W. 368, 
370 (Tenn. 1907); Cameron v. Ah Quong, 96 P. 1025, 1027 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908); Mattingly v. Houston, 52 So. 
78, 80 (Ala. 1909); Maxwell Steel Vault Co. v. Nat’l Casket Co., 205 F. 515, 522 (N.D.N.Y. 1913); Gardner v. 
W. Union Tel. Co., 81 S.E. 259, 260 (Ga. Ct. App. 1914); Schrade v. Camillus Cutlery Co., 242 F. 523, 526 
(N.D.N.Y. 1917); Clark v. Berlin Realty Co., 164 P. 333, 334–35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1917); Ross v. Chi. & Alton 
R.R. Co., 225 Ill. App. 633, 638 (1922); Purcell v. Wash. & Old Dominion Ry., Inc., 111 S.E. 300, 301 (Va. 
1922); McCahon v. Quick Serv. Laundry Co., 263 S.W. 238, 241 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924); Piepmeier v. Meck, 153 
N.E. 523, 524 (Ohio Ct. App. 1925); Sivalls Motor Co. v. Chastain, 5 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. Ct. App. 1928); 
Tristram v. Marques, 3 P.2d 947, 950 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931); City of Princeton v. Baker, 35 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1931); Bausman v. Feeser, 17 Ohio Law Abs. 662, 663 (1934); Moore v. Rice, 80 S.W.2d 451, 453 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Saxton v. Tucker, 134 S.W.2d 590, 594 (Ky. Ct. App. 1939); Wilson v. Moudy, 123 
S.W.2d 828, 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938); Evatt v. Willard D. Martin, Inc., 19 N.E.2d 729, 731 (Mass. 1939); 
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nineteenth century is a reflex of the dissemination of written decisions and law 
reports in the United States, nonexistent in the previous century.107 The practice 
was also widely taught in professional textbooks and formbooks.108 
Even the U.S. Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of incorporation by 
reference, but only in cases related to criminal indictments.109 
The reference to a previous count that contained the missing information 
was valid even if the previous count was withdrawn, stricken, or dismissed.110 
 
Latman v. Kalmor Builders, Inc., 138 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (App. Div. 1955); Olson v. Johnson, 66 N.W.2d 346, 
349–50 (Wis. 1954). But see Sinclair v. Fitch, 3 E.D. Smith 677, 691 (N.Y. Ct. Com. P. 1857). This early New 
York case did not allow the first count to be aided by information contained in the second, probably without 
reference, despite the plaintiff’s protestation that the violation did not prejudice the defendant and that pleadings 
should be liberally construed to achieve substantial justice between the parties. 
 107. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 832 (2009) (“By 1822, about 140 volumes of American reports had been 
published, a striking contrast to the handful extant in 1804 . . . . By 1839 there were more than 500 volumes of 
American reports; by 1882, the number stood at 2,944 . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 108. See 1 ESTEE, supra note 20, at 210; VAN SANTVOORD, supra note 21, at 149; 1 BENJAMIN VAUGHAN 
ABBOTT & AUSTIN ABBOTT, A COLLECTION OF FORMS OF PRACTICE AND PLEADING 114 (New York, Baker, 
Voorhis & Co. 1875); 1 CHITTY, supra note 2, at 428–29; POMEROY, supra note 20, § 442; id. § 336, at 450–51 
(Thomas A. Bogle ed., 4th ed. 1904); RUMSEY, supra note 50, at 257; BAYLIES, supra note 52, at 47–50, 70–71; 
EDWIN E. BRYANT, THE LAW OF PLEADING UNDER THE CODES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 137, at 174 (Boston, 
Mass., Little, Brown & Co. 1894); SHIPMAN, supra note 12, §§ 252–54; PHILLIPS supra note 12, §§ 123, 202–
04; id. §§ 320–21, at 339–42 (Percival W. Viesselman ed., 2d ed. 1932); 1 ABBOTT & ALDEN, supra note 23, at 
7; PATTISON, supra note 23, § 234, at 137; 1 ABBOTT, supra note 22, at 33–36; 1 JOHN B. WINSLOW, WINSLOW’S 
FORMS OF PLEADING & PRACTICE UNDER THE CODE § 490, at 276 (1906); 1 NICHOLS, supra note 23, at 926–27; 
JAMES BARR AMES, A SELECTION OF CASES ON PLEADING 16–17 (1905); 2 HARRY B. BRADBURY, BRADBURY’S 
FORMS OF PLEADING IN LEGAL & EQUITABLE ACTIONS 1136, 1217, 1778 (1908); GOULD, supra note 13, at 357 
(George Gould ed., 4th ed., Franklin Fiske Heard ed., 5th ed., Arthur P. Will ed., 6th ed. 1909); 1 SUTHERLAND, 
supra note 74, § 193, at 128–29; 1 WILLIAM S. CAMPBELL, FORMS OF CODE PLEADING 11–13 (1912); 4 WAIT’S 
PRACTICE AT LAW, IN EQUITY AND IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 3650 (David Hopkins Hunt ed., 2d ed. 1913); W. 
S. SIMKINS, A FEDERAL EQUITY SUIT 279 (3d ed. 1916); SHIPMAN, supra note 12, §§ 78–79, at 200–01 (Henry 
Winthrop Ballantine ed., 3d ed. 1923); CLARK, supra note 4, § 70, at 312–16; 3 FRANCIS X. CARMODY & B. G. 
BONOMI, A TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN NEW YORK § 893, at 1700–05 (2d ed. 1931); CHARLES 
WALTER GARLAND, FORMS OF PLEADING IN ACTIONS FOR LEGAL OR EQUITABLE RELIEF §§ 59, 60, 1424 (1935); 
3 FRANCIS X. CARMODY ET AL., CARMODY-WAIT’S CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK PRACTICE § 20, at 449–50 
(1953); 12 NICHOLS-CAHILL’S ANNOTATED NYCP ACTS 204–06 (1956 & Supp. 1962); KOFFLER & REPPY, 
supra note 26, § 24, at 94–96. Compare POMEROY, supra note 20, § 575, at 626 (disallowing incorporation by 
reference in complaints), with id. § 716, at 736–37 (allowing incorporation by reference in defenses). 
 109. See, e.g., Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308, 315–17 (1894); Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 
633–34 (1896); Selvester v. United States, 170 U.S. 262, 267 (1897); Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 
236 U.S. 531, 534 (1915); see also Subpart III.H. 
 110. See Phillips v. Fielding (1792) 126 Eng. Rep. 464, 469; Nelson v. Swan, 13 Johns. 483, 485 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1816); Crookshank v. Gray, 20 Johns. 344, 344–48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823) (dismissing the first two counts, 
but keeping the third count because it made reference to the first); Morrison v. Spears, 8 Ala. 93, 94 (1845); 
Jones v. Vanzandt, F. Cas. 1057, 1058 (Ohio C.C. 1851) (holding that while the first and second counts were 
abandoned, they were not considered stricken from the record and could be referred to); Robinson v. Drummond, 
24 Ala. 174, 178 (1854) (concluding that second count was not isolated from the abandoned first count); Curtis 
v. Moore, 15 Wis. 134, 137–38 (1862); Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chi. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Rice, 48 Ill. App. 51, 
56 (1891) (“The withdrawal of the first count . . . did not take it out of being, as a subject of reference. It could 
not thereafter operate per se as an averment of anything in this suit, but it was still in existence and a part of the 
same paper with the second count.”); Blitz, 153 U.S. at 315–17; Crain, 162 U.S. at 633 (criminal case) (“[I]f the 
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And, in criminal proceedings, even if the defendant was acquitted on the first 
count.111 
Despite similarities in the general rule statement, however, the practice of 
incorporation by reference was complex and defied uniform interpretation. It 
varied considerably in time and space: it varied in the different courts, among 
the different states, and in the four centuries it remained in use. In addition, it 
varied to fit the peculiarities of the old procedural practices, the context of 
specific situations, and the needs of substantive laws. Moreover, some decisions 
were badly written or poorly researched, the matter was treated cursorily, the 
analysis was wrong, or the text was ambiguous. Some nuances may now be lost. 
Until the first quarter of the 1900s, the dogma that each count must contain 
all facts entitling the plaintiff to relief (or the defendant to a defense) was widely 
known by lawyers and even taught in casebooks and textbooks in the United 
States. For example, a 1916 casebook, part of West’s American Casebook 
Series, contained a subchapter entitled “Incorporation by Reference,” 
transcribing a well-researched case from the Supreme Court of Alabama.112 A 
1928 book from the West’s Hornbook Series also made reference to 
 
previous count be defective or is rejected, that circumstance will not vitiate the remaining counts, if the reference 
be sufficiently full to incorporate the matter going before with that in the count in which the reference is made.”); 
Anniston Elec. & Gas Co. v. Elwell, 42 So. 45, 48 (Ala. 1905); Shaughnessy v. Holt, 86 N.E. 256, 257 (Ill. 1908) 
(striking out a count is “a mere figure of speech”—it still remains on file as part of the record); McCahon v. 
Quick Serv. Laundry Co., 263 S.W. 238, 241 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924); McCord v. Rogers, 99 So. 794, 795 (Ala. 
1924); Barnard v. United States, 16 F.2d 451, 453 (9th Cir. 1926) (criminal case); Parker v. United States, 252 
F.2d 680, 681 (6th Cir. 1958) (criminal case) (“[T]he dismissal of a count does not necessarily vitiate later counts 
making reference to it, if the reference is sufficiently full to incorporate the matter in the later counts.”); see also 
ANTHON, supra note 19, § 5, at 40 (“The [first] count struck out was considered as in existence, and as a part of 
the record, for the purpose of making the new count and judgment on it good.”). But see Richardson v. Lanning, 
26 N.J.L. 130, 132 (1856) (“[I]f the special count . . . be stricken out, the common count, standing alone, would 
be insufficient, for it requires a reference to the special count to make it intelligible.”); Gilmore v. Christ Hosp., 
52 A. 241, 242 (N.J. 1902); Fraternal Tribunes v. Hanes, 100 Ill. App. 1, 3 (1902) (“[W]hen one count has been 
held bad on demurrer, it can not [sic] be resorted to for the purpose of helping and aiding another count.”); 2 
KERR, supra note 100, § 730, at 1001 (“[If] stuck out on demurrer, the subsequent part of the pleading adopting 
and incorporating by reference the stricken part will be defective . . . .”). 
 111. See Commonwealth v. Clapp, 82 Mass. 237, 237 (1860) (“In the most approved books of forms, ancient 
and modern, it is found, almost invariably, when an indictment contains more than one count, that all the counts, 
after the first, omit the description of the defendant which is contained and is necessary in the first, and describe 
him only as ‘the said [defendant].’”); State v. Lea, 41 Tenn. 175, 178 (1860); see also Phillips, 126 Eng. Rep. at 
469 (referring to a criminal case where the grand jury rejected the first three counts, but the remaining counts 
were sufficient because they had referred to the first one); 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 169 (Philadelphia, William Brown 1819) (“[T]hough the first count should be defective, or be 
rejected by the grand jury, this circumstance will not vitiate the residue . . . .”); 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 182, at 132 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1866). 
 112. See WHITTIER & MORGAN, supra note 26, at 436–37 (containing an edited version of the excellent 
Mardis’ Admr’s v. Shackleford, 6 Ala. 433 (1844)); see also WILLIAM H. LOYD, CASES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 
317 (1916) (containing an edited and annotated version of the excellent Hitchcock v. Munger, 15 N.H. 97 
(1844)); SUNDERLAND, supra note 26, at 452–56 (containing both Mardis, 6 Ala. 433, and Hitchcock, 15 N.H. 
97). 
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incorporation by reference.113 After that, the old dogma that each count must be 
complete disappeared from the Civil Procedure discourse and was forgotten. No 
modern law professor teaches or even has a clue about the dogma. Yet the empty 
teaching of incorporation by reference remains, detached from its original 
objective, and sometimes merely in passing.114 
So, American lawyers kept the exception to the dogma long after the 
dogma was gone. The result is that incorporation by reference is now an empty 
ritualistic practice in the United States in federal and state courts in civil and 
criminal litigation. 
D.  SOME STATES DID NOT ALLOW INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE 
Against centuries of common-law tradition, however, Indiana consistently 
demanded all counts in a complaint to be complete—it did not allow 
incorporation of facts in one count by reference to a previous one. Without the 
possibility of incorporating allegations previously made, the pleader had to 
repeat them at each count.115  
 
 113. See CLARK, supra note 4, § 70, at 312–16. This book was republished after the enactment of the Federal 
Rules, with no changes to this section, certainly by inertia. See CLARK, supra note 4, § 70 (1947). Charles Edward 
Clark was the chief drafter of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Michael E. Smith, Judge 
Charles E. Clark and The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914 (1976). 
 114. See, e.g., TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 556 (mentioning incorporation by reference in passing); 
HAZARD, LEUBSDORF & BASSETT, supra note 6, § 4.7 (teaching incorporation by reference, but not the dogma); 
FREER, supra note 6, § 7.3.1 (same); BAICKER-MCKEE & JANSSEN, supra note 6, at 186 (same); see also sources 
and text accompanying supra notes 5–8. The exception is FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 6, § 5.13, 
a modern book that teaches the dogma, albeit indirectly and ambiguously, citing cases from 1860, 1879, 1895, 
1899, 1916, 1940, and 1961 (the last case was not on point). The practice of teaching incorporation by reference 
detached from the dogma is not recent. The empty teaching of incorporation by reference were common also in 
older books. See, e.g., DAVID W. LOUISELL & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING 
AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL 187 (1962) (transcribing a pleading with a clause of incorporation by 
reference, but not teaching that each count must be complete); 1 MOORE & FRIEDMAN, supra note 76, § 10.03 
(same). 
 115. See, e.g., Leabo v. Detrick, 18 Ind. 414, 415 (1862); Day v. Vallette, 25 Ind. 42, 43 (1865) (“Our code 
is not liberal enough to warrant us in sustaining [an incomplete count].”); Mason v. Weston, 29 Ind. 561, 563 
(1868) (requiring the second paragraph of the pleading to re-state facts in the first paragraph); Clarke v. 
Featherston, 32 Ind. 142, 144 (1869); Potter v. Earnest, 45 Ind. 416, 418 (1873); Silvers v. Junction R.R. Co., 
43 Ind. 435, 446 (1873) (“Each paragraph must be perfect and complete within itself, and defective allegations 
in one paragraph can not [sic] be aided by reference to another . . . .”); McCarnan v. Cochran, 57 Ind. 166, 169–
70 (1877); Smith v. Little, 67 Ind. 549, 553 (1879); Field v. Burton, 71 Ind. 380, 387–89 (1880); Entsminger v. 
Jackson, 73 Ind. 144, 145, 147 (1880) (on the second count, the plaintiff described the property as “the property 
mentioned in the first paragraph of this complaint,” but the court did not allow this); Lynn v. Crim, 96 Ind. 89, 
92 (1884) (ironically following the dogma despite using the principle of harmless error in another matter); 
Ludlow v. Ludlow, 9 N.E. 769, 770 (Ind. 1887) (“[E]ach paragraph of a pleading, whether of complaint, answer 
or reply, must be perfect and complete within itself, and can not [sic] be aided by reference to another 
paragraph.”); Farris v. Jones, 14 N.E. 484, 487 (Ind. 1887); Little v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 34 N.E. 499, 500 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1893) (“It has been so often decided, as to require no citation of authorities, that the allegations of one 
paragraph of a pleading can not [sic] be aided by reference to the allegations of another paragraph. Each pleading 
must be complete in itself.”); Corbey v. Rogers, 52 N.E. 748, 750 (Ind. 1899); see also BLISS, supra note 13, 
§ 121, at 162. But see Lowry v. Dutton, 28 Ind. 473, 475 (1867) (allowing prefatory matters without repetition 
or reference); Thompson v. Edwards, 85 Ind. 414, 417 (1882) (holding that names of parties need not be 
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Indiana, then, had the distinction of adopting an irrational dogma, without 
adopting the silly exception that made the dogma manageable. As one of the few 
states that did not allow incorporation by reference, Indiana was a dangerous 
place for lawyers who trusted the books and formbooks, most of which 
considered incorporation by reference as a fundamental feature of common-law 
or code pleading. 
No cases were found from the time when Indiana was a common-law 
pleading state, that is, before the enactment of the Indiana Rules of Practice. One 
could assume that the rule at common law was also against incorporation by 
reference. But the issue is not so simple. Georgia, for example, allowed 
incorporation by reference when it was a common-law pleading state, but 
curiously stopped allowing it, without reason, when it became a code state.116  
The Indiana practice was expressly repudiated by other state courts. An 
1881 Missouri decision, for example, stated: 
[W]e are unable to perceive any reason, either of policy or convenience, [in favor 
of the Indiana practice] . . . . We prefer the common-law rule, which permitted 
the pleader to save the repeating of matter contained in a preceding count, by 
making express reference to the preceding count . . . . This, so far as we know, 
has been the practice of good pleaders in this State.117 
Despite the obvious inconvenience, Indiana upheld this rule as late as 
1912.118 At a certain point, however, it was inevitable that Indiana would start 
allowing incorporation by reference. It is surprising that it took so long. 
Incorporation by reference was first authorized in Indiana by a 1917 statute,119 
then maintained in the 1933 Indiana Rules of Procedure.120 The current Indiana 
 
repeated); Carver v. Carver, 97 Ind. 497, 503 (1884) (same); McCarnan v. Cochran, 57 Ind. 166, 169–70 (1877) 
(allowing amendment). 
 116. Compare Hutson v. King, 22 S.E. 615, 617 (Ga. 1895) (allowing incorporation by reference while 
Georgia was a common-law pleading state), with Cooper v. Robert Portner Brewing Co., 38 S.E. 91, 93 (Ga. 
1901) (disallowing incorporation by reference after Georgia became a code pleading state). But, as shown, other 
code pleading decisions from Georgia allowed incorporation by reference. See sources cited supra note 106. 
 117. Boeckler v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 10 Mo. App. 448, 451 (1881); see also St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. City 
of St. Louis, 86 Mo. 495, 499 (1885); Green v. Clifford, 29 P. 331, 331–32 (Cal. 1892). 
 118. See Lake Erie & W. R.R. Co. v. Moore, 81 N.E. 85, 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 1907); Citizens’ Tel. Co. v. Ft. 
Wayne & S. Ry. Co., 100 N.E. 309, 310 (Ind. Ct. App. 1912). 
 119. See Act of Feb. 24, 1917, ch. 27, 1917 Ind. Laws 68 (“An Act regulating pleadings, in the courts of the 
state of Indiana, so as to avoid unnecessary repetition of allegations in the several and respective paragraphs of 
such pleadings.”). 
 120. IND. CODE. ANN. § 2-1006 (Burns & Watson 1933) (“[T]o avoid needless repetition, such parties 
[joining claims] . . . may, by proper reference and identification, incorporate any clause or clauses in one [1] 
paragraph thereof into any other paragraph thereof, without repetition of the language employed in the first 
instance. And all matters thus incorporated in the subsequent paragraphs of pleading shall be treated and deemed 
as part of such subsequent paragraphs of the respective pleadings as if fully and completely repeated at length 
therein.”); see also Daugherty v. Daugherty, 57 N.E.2d 599, 601 (Ind. Ct. App. 1944) (“[State law] authorizes 
the incorporation in a pleading of parts of a prior paragraph by reference and identification without repetition of 
the language employed in the first instance.”). 
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law, enacted in 1970, and modeled after the Federal Rules, also authorizes it.121 
And Indiana formbooks encourage the formula.122 Incorporation by reference is 
now widespread in Indiana. 
A few other states also disallowed incorporation by reference. Although 
some decisions take an unequivocal approach, others are ambiguous, violate 
other state precedents, are applicable only in special circumstances, or are not 
well reasoned.123  
South Carolina is another state that unambiguously disallowed 
incorporation by reference: 
At first it would seem to be harsh, rigid and extremely technical, and in conflict 
with the liberal tendencies of the code; but, upon consideration, it will be found 
based on correct principles and consonant with the true theory of pleadings. The 
code makes a considerable stride when it permits two or more different causes of 
action to be joined in the same complaint, and unless these different causes are 
kept separate and distinct, much confusion and complication must be the result. 
To prevent this, an orderly system of pleadings should be adopted, and to this end 
each action should be stated in a single and independent division, so that 
defendant might meet it without confusion with others, and each should contain 
all the averments necessary to raise the issues upon which the case is to be 
tried.124 
In other states, such as Montana and Oregon, incorporation by reference 
was limited to introductory allegations (also called prefatory or inducement). 
Essential elements constituting the cause of action, however, needed to be fully 
repeated at each count.125 This was a misinterpretation of the pleading tradition 
 
 121. IND. R. TRIAL P. 10(c) (“Statements in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the 
same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion.”). 
 122. See, e.g., 23 TRACEY BATEMAN & THOMAS MUSKUS, INDIANA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA: PLEADING, 
DISCOVERY, AND PRETRIAL PRACTICE § 21 (updated Jan. 2019); 21 STEPHEN E. ARTHUR, INDIANA PRACTICE 
SERIES: TRIAL PRACTICE § 13.19 (2d ed., updated June 2018); 9 STEPHEN E. ARTHUR, INDIANA PRACTICE 
SERIES: PROCEDURAL FORMS WITH PRACTICE COMMENTARY §§ 21.5, 50.5 (3d ed., updated Dec. 2018); 24 
GEORGE T. PATTON, JR., INDIANA PRACTICE SERIES: APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 12.1 (3d ed., updated Dec. 2018). 
 123. See Eureka Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 57 N.E. 57, 60 (Ohio 1900); Cooper v. Robert Portner 
Brewing Co., 38 S.E. 91, 93 (Ga. 1901); Dailey v. O’Brien, 96 S.W. 521, 522 (Ky. Ct. App. 1906) (quoting 
Black v. Holloway, 41 S.W. 576 (Ky. Ct. App. 1897)); Long v. Bowersox, 19 Ohio Dec. 494, 501, 504 (Ct. 
Com. P. 1909); Train v. Emerson, 74 S.E. 241, 241 (Ga. 1912); Smith v. Phila., Balt. & Wash. R.R. Co., 115 A. 
416, 419 (Del. Super. Ct. 1921); Reid v. Bryant, 66 S.E.2d 826, 827 (Ga. 1951); see also 1 MOORE & FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 76, § 10.03 (citing cases in several states where incorporation by reference was [apparently] not 
allowed). 
  The California Supreme Court consistently allowed incorporation by reference. But in Pennie v. 
Hildreth it issued an inexplicable dicta, calling it “a slovenly mode of pleading, only convenient to the attorney 
who writes the pleading, and very inconvenient to opposing counsel and the courts, and should not be tolerated.” 
22 P. 398, 399–400 (Cal. 1889). 
 124. Hammond v. Port Royal & Augusta Ry. Co., 15 S.C. 10, 28 (1881); see also Latimer v. Sullivan, 8 
S.E. 639, 640 (S.C. 1889); Wright v. Willoughby, 60 S.E. 971, 972 (S.C. 1908) (“For no principle of pleading 
is better settled than that each cause of action must stand or fall on its own allegations, without reference to the 
allegations to be found in the statement of another cause of action.”). 
 125. See McKay v. McDougal, 48 P. 988, 992 (Mont. 1897) (“Inasmuch as the cause must be remanded to 
the district court, we advise the plaintiff to follow the general rule that each separate division or count of the 
complaint must be complete in itself . . . .”); Hefferlin v. Karlman, 74 P. 201, 204 (Mont. 1903) (per curiam); 
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and the rule regarding introductory allegations.126 Today Montana and Oregon 
allow incorporation by reference, as do all fifty states and the federal courts.127 
These states’ refusal to allow incorporation by reference is perplexing 
because there is no English common-law precedent for this position, and none 
was ever cited. Some cases cite Pomeroy’s classic treatise on Code Remedies, 
but the author is contradictory and wrong.128 Other cases cite Philemon Bliss’s 
treatise on pleading, which mistakenly stated that New York did not allow 
incorporation by reference.129 Pomeroy and Bliss are American books, both 
published under code pleading. The peculiar rule in these states disregarded the 
practice at common law and in the rest of the country and was largely ignored 
in mainstream cases and textbooks. 
On the other side of the spectrum, an isolated 1893 New York case 
displayed remarkably modern reasoning. The court allowed omissions in the 
first and second counts to be cured by statements in the third count, even without 
specific reference.130 The court reasoned that “[t]he defendants’ contention is 
 
Murray v. City of Butte, 88 P. 789, 792 (Mont. 1907); T.C. Power & Bro. v. Turner, 97 P. 950, 955 (Mont. 
1908); see also Waechter v. St. Louis & Meramec River R.R. Co., 88 S.W. 147, 148–49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1905) 
(finding that the separate causes of action were stated “separately . . . in such manner as to be intelligibly 
distinguished”); Graves v. St. Louis, Memphis & Se. Ry. Co., 112 S.W. 736, 739 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908). Compare 
Gardner v. McWilliams, 69 P. 915, 915 (Or. 1902) (disallowing incorporation by reference because the fact was 
not a matter of inducement), with Smith v. Martin, 185 P. 236, 238 (Or. 1919) (allowing incorporation by 
reference because the fact was a matter of inducement). 
 126. See sources and text accompanying supra note 23 (discussing that in most states introductory or 
prefatory information could be stated once at the beginning of the pleading and need not be referred to in each 
count). 
 127. MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 25, ch. 20, R. 10(c) (“A statement in a pleading may be adopted by reference 
elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other pleading or motion.”) (Laws 2017); OR. R. CIV. P. 16(D) 
(“Statements in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading.”). 
 128. Compare POMEROY, supra note 20, § 575, at 626 (disallowing incorporation by reference in 
complaints), with § 716, at 736 (allowing incorporation by reference in defenses). The same contradiction exists 
in the 1883 and 1904 editions. See POMEROY, supra note 20, §§ 575, 716 (2d ed. 1883); id. § 336, at 450–51 
(Thomas A. Bogle ed., 4th ed. 1904). 
 129. BLISS, supra note 13, § 121, at 162. Bliss cited two early New York cases: Landau v. Levy, 1 Abb. Pr. 
376 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) and Sinclair v. Fitch, 3 E.D. Smith 677, 689 (N.Y Ct. Com. P. 1857). But these cases 
do not support his position that New York did not allow incorporation by reference. Landau was about improper 
joinder of legal and equitable claims. 1 Abb. Pr. at 379. Sinclair did not allow the first count be completed by 
information contained on the second (not the other way around) probably without reference. 3 E.D. Smith at 
689. Dozens of New York cases at the time Bliss wrote the first edition of his treatise allowed incorporation by 
reference. See, e.g., Xenia Branch Bank v. Lee, 7 Abb. 372, 386–87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858) (addressing Landau 
and citing several English and New York common-law cases: Barnes, Tindall, Phillips, Crookshank, and 
Freeland); see also supra note 106. 
 130. Smith v. Sage, 25 N.Y.S. 103, 105 (Sup. Ct. 1893); see also Rider v. Robbins, 13 Mass. 284 (1816) 
(allowing an omission on the second count to be cured by a verdict, or supplied by the first count, without 
incorporation by reference); United Sur. Co. v. Summers, 72 A. 775, 780 (Md. Ct. App. 1909) (allowing 
subsequent counts not to mention the contract); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Adams, 147 S.W. 384, 386 
(Ky. 1912) (allowing a first count, without a prayer for relief, because the second count contained it and noting 
that “it would be very technical” to rule otherwise); Tristram v. Marques, 3 P.2d 947, 949–950 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1931) (allowing incorporation by reference that was “neither apt nor express” because the defendant was not 
prejudiced nor misled by the failure). 
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too technical, and not in accordance with the requirements of substantial justice. 
Pleadings should be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice 
between the parties.”131 
One needs to wait a century to find another case adopting a similarly 
enlightened approach. In 1981, a Louisiana court refused to dismiss a complaint 
against the defendant’s argument that some paragraphs did not incorporate other 
paragraphs by reference.132 The court argued that agreeing with the defendant’s 
technical argument that the plaintiff “somehow” failed to state a cause of action 
would be contrary to the requirement that “every pleading shall be so construed 
as to do substantial justice.”133 
E.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE FORMULA—SAID AND AFORESAID 
Originally, in order to incorporate by reference previously stated facts, 
lawyers did not write a full sentence or paragraph as they do now. Pleaders 
simply started the new count with an introductory formula like and whereas 
also, or and for a second count, or and for a further cause of action. That would 
keep the counts separate, as required by common-law and code pleading. 
In addition, the plaintiff had to pepper the text with pointing words like 
said, same, as above stated, aforesaid, or meaning attached to every previously 
stated fact.134 This would work as a valid incorporation of previous facts, as long 
 
 131. Smith, 25 N.Y.S. at 105 (citing N.Y. CODE CIV. PROC. § 519 (1877)); Ramsey v. Johnson, 58 P. 755, 
757 (Wyo. 1899) (referring to “error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings, which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the adverse party,” but demanding express reference to the previous count). 
 132. Carmouche v. Oubre, 394 So. 2d 805, 807 (La. Ct. App. 1981). 
 133. Id.  
 134. See 1 CHITTY, supra note 2, at 397; EDWARD LAWES, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON PLEADING IN 
ASSUMPSIT 94–95 (London, M. & S. Broke 1810); VAN SANTVOORD, supra note 21, at 149; 1 CHITTY, supra 
note 2, at 429 (Henry Greening & J.C. Perkins eds., Springfield, Mass., G & C Merriam, 7th Eng. ed. & 16th 
Am. ed. 1876); PHILLIPS, supra note 12, § 203, at 181–82; Barnes v. May (1591) 78 Eng. Rep. 496; Cro. Eliz. 
240; Baldwin v. Elphinston (1775) 96 Eng. Rep. 610; Dent’s Adm’r v. Scott, 3 H. & J. 28, 28–29 (Md. Ct. App. 
1810); Nelson v. Swan, 13 Johns. 483, 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816); Frazier v. Felton, 1 Hawks 231, 231 (N.C. 
1820) (criminal case); Crookshank v. Gray, 20 Johns. 344, 344–48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823); Griswold v. Nat’l Ins. 
Co., 3 Cow 96, 98 n.a (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824); Loomis v. Swick, 3 Wend. 205, 207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829); Porter 
v. Cumings, 7 Wend. 172, 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1831); Canterbury v. Hill, 4 Stew. & P. 224, 229 (Ala. 1833); 
Nestle v. Van Slyck, 2 Hill 282, 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842); Hitchcock v. Munger, 15 N.H. 97, 102 (1844); 
Freeland v. McCullough, 1 Denio 414, 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845); Jones v. Vanzandt, 13 F. Cas. 1057, 1058 
(C.C. Ohio 1851); Benedict v. Seymour, 6 How. Pr. 298, 299 (N.Y. 1852); Williams v. Richmond, 9 How. 522, 
523 (N.Y. 1854); Beckwith v. Mollohan, 2 W. Va. 477, 478 (1868); Bowler v. Bd. of Immigration, 7 Haw. 563, 
565 (1889); Aulbach v. Dahler, 43 P. 322, 322 (Idaho 1896); Ramsey v. Johnson, 58 P. 755, 757 (Wyo. 1899); 
Wilson v. Hoffman, 123 F. 984, 987 (C.C.N.J. 1903); Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Wilcox, 61 So. 
908, 909 (Ala. 1913); see also the forms in JOHN WENTWORTH, A COMPLETE SYSTEM OF PLEADING (London, 
G.G. & J. Robinson 1797–98) (ten volumes); LAWES, supra note 12, at 60; ANTHON, supra note 19, at 312; 2 
CHITTY, supra note 2, at 260 n.t; STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 282; BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, JR., FORMS OF PRACTICE 
57, 73, 80, 105 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, Little & Wilkins 1828); ANTHON, supra note 19, at 342, 345 (West 
Brookfield, Mass., Merriam & Chapin, 4th ed. 1848); P. B. WILCOX, PRACTICAL FORMS IN ACTIONS, PERSONAL 
AND REAL 76, 91, 270 (Columbus, Ohio, Isaac N. Whiting, 2d ed. 1848); STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 256 (Samuel 
Tyler ed., Washington, D.C., William H. Morrison, 3d Am. ed. 1882); 2 CHITTY, supra note 2 (Henry Greening 
& J.C. Perkins eds., Springfield, Mass., G & C Merriam, 7th Eng. ed. & 16th Am. ed. 1883); 1 W.H. MICHAEL 
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as the incorporation was express and the matter referred to was definite, certain, 
and clearly identified.135 
In 1894, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court was satisfied that the 
expression “said election” in the third count referred to the election mentioned 
in the second count of the same indictment: 
The only question that could arise upon the third count is whether the words of 
the first count, referring to the election had and held on the 8th day of November, 
1892, for Representative in Congress, can be drawn through the second count 
into the third count by the words, “at the said election.” As the election named in 
the first count is the only one specifically described in the indictment, there can 
be no doubt that the words “at said election” in the third count refer to the election 
described in the first count.136 
Below is a typical second count of a complaint in the United States in the 
early 1800s: 
SECOND COUNT. And the said [defendant] further saith, that the said [plaintiff] 
further contriving and intending as aforesaid, heretofore, to wit, on, &c. 
aforesaid, at &c. aforesaid, falsely, wickedly, and maliciously did publish a 
certain other false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory libel, of and 
concerning the said [defendant] and of and concerning the said action, which had 
been so depending as aforesaid, and of and concerning the evidence by him, the 
said [defendant] given on the said trial as such witness as aforesaid, containing, 
amongst other things, the false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous 
matter, of and concerning the said [defendant], and of and concerning the said 
action, and of and concerning the evidence given by him, the said [defendant] on 
the said trial, as such witness as aforesaid, that is to say . . . .137 
Ten saids and six aforesaids clutter a paragraph constructed of a single 
breathlessly long sentence, as was common at the time. 
 
& WILLIAM MACK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORMS AND PRECEDENTS (Long Island, N.Y., James Cockcroft 1896); 
CARUTHERS, supra note 57, at 582 (Andrew B. Martin ed., 4th ed. 1903). 
 135. See Stiles v. Nokes (1806) 103 Eng. Rep. 191, 194–96; 7 East 493, 502, 506–07 (holding that the 
reference must be clearly identified); Crookshank, 20 Johns. at 344–48 (same); Simmons v. Fairchild, 42 Barb. 
404, 409 (N.Y. 1864); see also Receivers of Bank of New Brunswick v. Neilson, 15 N.J.L. 337, 337–38 (1836) 
(holding that the reference was not clearly identified); Holton v. Muzzy, 30 Vt. 365, 366 (1858) (same); Jones 
v. Marshall, 10 Ky. Op. 598, 599 (Ct. App. 1880) (holding that the reference was not clearly identified when the 
plaintiff merely said, “making such facts in the first paragraph as are necessary to the cause of action in the 
second paragraph”); Ramsey v. Johnson, 52 P. 1084, 1085 (Wyo. 1898); Ramsey v. Johnson, 58 P. 755, 757 
(Wyo.1899); Gilmore v. Christ Hosp., 53 A. 241, 242 (N.J. 1902); see also POMEROY, supra note 20, § 716, at 
736–37; 1 MOORE & FRIEDMAN, supra note 76, § 10.03. Compare Opdycke v. Easton & Amboy R.R. Co., 68 
N.J.L. 12, 13 (1902) (determining that “on the day aforesaid” was not sufficiently specific because the preceding 
count mentioned several different days), with Taylor v. N.J. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 56 A. 152, 153 (N.J. 
1903) (concluding that “on the day and year aforesaid” was sufficiently specific because only one day was 
mentioned in the preceding count).  
 136. Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308, 316 (1894) (criminal case); see also Sampson v. Commonwealth, 
5 Watts & Serg. 385, 387–88 (Pa. 1843) (criminal case) (discussing the meaning of “said”); FRANCIS WHARTON, 
A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 298, at 200 (Philadelphia, Kay & Bro., 8th ed. 1880) 
(discussing the meaning of “said”). 
 137. ANTHON, supra note 19, at 312–13 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (“[I]f the second count 
commence—‘And whereas also,’ &c, it will nevertheless be sufficient.”). 
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This practice explains, in part, the legal profession’s addiction to these 
words that now sound stilted. Legal writers and general stylists have protested 
for decades the legalese and archaism of said, same, and aforesaid. Even the 
most learned scholars, however, mistakenly think that the objective of these 
words was merely to give precision to the text.138 Although it is true that these 
words were used with the objective of giving precision to a term,139 that is not 
the origin of the habit. Most scholars ignore that these words once had a specific 
role in common-law and code pleading: from time immemorial it was important 
to make an explicit reference to “said farm,” “said merchant,” “said defendant,” 
or even “said John Smith” to incorporate facts previously mentioned in a 
pleading. 
A perceived lack of iron-clad precision in pleading technique, as 
capriciously decided by the trial judge, or even by the court of appeals after a 
favorable verdict for the plaintiff, could make the count improper. For example, 
if, by mistake, the pleader referred a second time to a promissory note, instead 
of the said promissory note, the court might never really know for sure whether 
the pleader was referring to the same note previously mentioned or another 
one.140 Or, if the plaintiff referred to the contract described in the first count as 
“said contract,” the court may find it “impossible to tell to what contract the 
plaintiff refers” because the plaintiff did not state the particulars of the contract, 
like date, consideration, and subject matter.141 
These were the types of nightmares that kept pleaders awake at night, at a 
time when all counts had to be complete. On the one hand, if a pleading was 
repetitive, it could violate the rule of concision. Yet, at the same time, each count 
 
 138. See, e.g., Said, H. W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH LANGUAGE USAGE 533 (Sir Ernest 
Gowers ed., 2d ed. 1965) (“In legal documents . . . are traditional precautions against any possible 
ambiguity . . . .”); DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 305, 318, 405 (1963); GARNER’S 
DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 37, 793–94, 796 (2011) (“The usage had its origins in loan translation.”); Said, 
GARNER’S MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 804–05 (4th ed. 2016) (“Legal writers formerly used this word as a 
supposedly more precise equivalent of the, this, that, these, or those.”); ANNE ENQUIST ET AL., JUST WRITING: 
GRAMMAR, PUNCTUATION, AND STYLE FOR THE LEGAL WRITER 120, 125 (5th ed. 2017). But see ANTONIO GIDI 
& HENRY WEIHOFEN, LEGAL WRITING STYLE 53–54, 91–95 (3d ed. 2018) (discussing the use of said, aforesaid, 
and same in the historical context of incorporation by reference). 
 139. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§ 2173.05(d) (9th ed. rev. 2018), https://mpep.uspto.gov/RDMS/MPEP/current#/current/d0e18.html (stating 
that a claim may be indefinite if it lacks antecedent basis); see also ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS 
OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 3:14 (7th ed. 2018) (discussing use of indefinite article a when an element is first 
mentioned on a patent claim and the use of definite articles the or said to refer to previously mentioned elements). 
 140. Nestle v. Van Slyck, 2 Hill 282, 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (“[I]nstead of an innuendo pointing to ‘the’ 
note already mentioned, the innuendo speaks of ‘a’ note which may or may not be the same one that is mentioned 
in the inducement.” (emphasis added)); see also Gertler v. Linscott, 1 N.W. 579, 580 (Minn. 1879) (“We might 
conjecture that the ‘mills’ mentioned in the second are the same as the mill or mills mentioned in the 
first. . . . even if it were permitted to indulge in conjecture . . . .”). 
 141. Weber v. Squier, 51 Mo. App. 601, 603–05 (1892). But see Ramsey v. Johnson, 8 Wyo. 476 (1899) 
(holding that the expression “said contract” in the second count was an unmistakable reference to the contract 
referred to in the first count, no other). 
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had to contain every legal element of the cause of action. If a pleader struck the 
wrong balance between concision and completeness, the error could be fatal. 
F.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE FORMULA—REPEAT AND REALLEGE 
The said/aforesaid formula worked in common-law and code pleading, 
undisturbed, for at least three centuries. The current repeat, reiterate, and 
reallege formula, transcribed above,142 was a fruit of the American ingenuity. It 
was conceived towards the end of the nineteenth century under code pleading. 
Although it is impossible to determine the moment when lawyers started using 
the formula in their pleadings, one can get a glimpse through the cases. 
In a New York case decided in 1886, a complaint contained a primitive 
version of the formula:  
[T]he plaintiff . . . “repeats and reiterates all the allegations hereinbefore 
contained, and makes them a part of this her second cause of action.”143 
Although this is the earliest recorded example of the current formula, the 
language was brewed in the practice of the previous decades, as risk-averse 
lawyers struggled to make sure that judges would approve of their incorporation 
by reference. The plaintiff in the case above, however, did not think that a 
boilerplate reference to the allegations in the first cause of action was enough: 
he still used said and aforesaid several times in the statement of facts for the 
second count to make sure all facts were tied up with the first. So, the first 
generation of the new formula was added to the old, in a belt-and-suspenders 
strategy. 
A few years later, in 1892, however, the formula suffered a major setback 
when a North Dakota court did not accept it: 
For a third cause of action plaintiff makes part thereof each and every allegation 
contained in the first and second causes of action herein, so far as the same set 
forth the promises and agreements made by and between plaintiff and defendant, 
and the obligations arising therefrom; and further alleges . . . .144 
The court found no authority to support this formula as a proper way to 
incorporate facts by reference to the preceding parts of the complaint. For the 
court, the reference was too vague and ineffectual to identify specific facts, 
leaving the court, and the opposing party, to aimlessly explore the complaint in 
search of them.145 The pleader probably had not used said and aforesaid enough. 
If the pleader had used these magic “pointing words,” the court would not have 
found the references so vague. 
 
 142. See supra Subpart I. 
 143. Bogardus v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 4 N.E. 522, 527 (N.Y. 1886). 
 144. Jasper v. Hazen, 51 N.W. 583, 583 (N.D. 1892) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the 
plaintiff’s complaint). 
 145. Id. 
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Despite this setback, the formula survived. And in 1898, in the first edition 
of their formbook, Austin Abbott and Carlos Alden proposed this simple 
version: 
The plaintiff repeats and realleges as part of this cause of action, all the 
allegations contained in paragraphs __of the first cause of action.146 
The formula was followed by a light selection of saids and aforesaids, but 
much less, compared to the previous tradition. 
After this boilerplate was included in formbooks, practitioners throughout 
the country started using it.147 Eventually, it was expressly sanctioned by the 
courts.148 Lawyers never looked back. 
By the second edition of Abbott & Alden’s formbook, published in 1918, 
the formula had mushroomed to something closer to the current version:  
The [plaintiff] repeats and realleges as part of this [cause of action], each and all 
of the allegations contained in paragraphs __of the [first cause of action,] with 
like effect as if herein fully realleged, and incorporates herein all the facts therein 
set forth [and the denials therein contained].149 
Eventually, the bizarre formula was fully established in the practice of code 
pleading.150 The formula probably did not make sense even then, but no one ever 
noticed or challenged it. And the formula has endured, substantially unaltered, 
 
 146. 1 AUSTIN ABBOTT & CARLOS ALDEN, FORMS OF PLEADING IN ACTIONS FOR LEGAL OR EQUITABLE 
RELIEF 4, 451 (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1898). The formbook, however, was not consistent. See id. at 
458, 504 (not using the formula in a complaint with more than one claim). 
 147. On the definition of boilerplate, see generally Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Breaking the 
Boilerplate Habit in Civil Discovery, 51 AKRON L. REV. 683, 684–98 (2017) (“Something becomes boilerplate 
not because it is used repeatedly but because it is used thoughtlessly.”). 
 148. See, e.g., Green v. Clifford, 29 P. 331, 331–32 (Cal. 1892) (“Plaintiff hereby refers to paragraph I. of 
the first cause of action, hereinbefore set forth, and expressly makes said paragraph a part of this cause of action, 
as if incorporated herein.”); Treweek v. Howard, 39 P. 20, 21 (Cal. 1895) (“The plaintiff here repeats and alleges 
all the matters and things set forth and alleged in the subdivisions of this second amended complaint, numbered 
1, 2, 3, 4, and prays that the same be taken and deemed a part of this cause of action, the same as though herein 
set out at length.”); Bigelow v. Drummond, 90 N.Y.S. 913, 916 (App. Div. 1904) (“Plaintiffs repeat and reallege 
all the statements contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the first cause of action . . . .”); Fla. Cent. & P.R. Co. v. 
Foxworth, 25 So. 338, 340 (Fla. 1899) (“And for a fourth count the plaintiff avers each and every allegation of 
the first count, and further alleges that . . . .”); Realty Revenue Guar. Co. v. Farm, Stock & Home Publ’g Co., 
82 N.W. 857, 857 (Minn. 1900) (“Plaintiff realleges and reaffirms all the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 
of plaintiff’s first cause of action.”); Marietta v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chi. & St. Louis Ry. Co, 100 N.Y.S. 
1027, 1028 (Sup. Ct. 1906) (“The plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and alleges each and every allegation contained in 
paragraphs first and second of the complaint with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.”); West v. 
Bank of Lahoma, 86 P. 59, 59 (1906) (“And for a second cause of action, plaintiff repeats the general allegations 
preceding his first cause of action, and makes the same a part of this second cause of action, just as though the 
same was herein set out again in the same words.”). 
 149. 1 ABBOTT & ALDEN, supra note 23, at 5–6 (assuring readers that “this is a proper method of allegation,” 
and citing, as authority, Bigelow, 90 N.Y.S. at 916). 
 150. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 108, at 11–13 (offering three similar versions of the formula, each 
based on a different case); see also formbooks cited supra note 108. 
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for more than a century, passing along from generation to generation until 
today.151  
With time, the formula became a safe and sufficient method to incorporate 
previously alleged facts into a subsequent count, and lawyers slowly stopped 
feeling the need to pepper their complaints with same, said and aforesaid after 
every word previously mentioned. These words slowly lost their purpose in 
pleadings and became useless; no one remembered why they used them in the 
past. And they disappeared. 
But the change from “pointing words” to a formula was painful for 
pleaders. Initially, the formula was not uniformly accepted: it took a while to 
gain favor with judges that had forged their careers in the old tradition. Some 
courts found the use of the repeat and reallege formula “obviously unnecessary 
and highly objectionable” where a pleader failed to narrow the scope of the 
referenced allegations, and unintentionally incorporated an irrelevant allegation 
from a previous count.152 Several courts did not accept the formula for one 
reason or another.153 If the reference to a preceding count was definite and 
certain, however, courts had no objection to it.154 
If this artificial and meaningless repeat and reallege formula is at all 
necessary, and if it is sufficient, maybe it is time to start another phase in this 
evolution. Maybe pleaders could get away with writing the formula only once 
in each pleading, instead of once in each count. At the beginning or end of each 
pleading, the party could simply write, “every paragraph in this complaint (or 
defense) is incorporated in each count.” 
In 1964, a smart and impatient lawyer from Colorado tried to do this in 
federal court. The first paragraph of the complaint stated: 
 1. Each statement and allegation in each count of this Complaint shall be 
considered as repeated and realleged and incorporated by this reference into any 
other count of this Complaint where such incorporation shall be or appear 
necessary to the validity of the cause of action or claim for relief therein stated.155 
The court did not accept this formula, not because it was not suitable, but 
because the incorporation was not explicit. The court, as several courts before 
and after, was troubled by the expression “where such incorporation shall be or 
appear necessary.”156 The court wondered “shall appear necessary to whom?” 
and said that “[t]his prayer could even be interpreted as an attempt by the 
 
 151. This proves that boilerplate “has a toughness and resilience worthy of the steel plate from which it 
takes its name.” See Gensler & Rosenthal, supra note 147, at 684–85. 
 152. See, e.g., Bogardus v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 4 N.E. 522, 528 (N.Y. 1886). 
 153. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jones, 74 N.Y.S. 116, 116 (App. Div. 1902) (not accepting the following language: 
“Making the first six sections therein a part thereof.”); Clinckett v. Casseres, 200 N.Y.S. 178, 183 (App. Div. 
1923) (not accepting the formula, without explanation, and striking out three defenses, possibly because they 
were not sufficiently specific). 
 154. See, e.g., Treweek v. Howard, 39 P. 20, 22 (Cal. 1895). 
 155. Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 773 (D. Colo. 1964) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting the plaintiffs’ complaint). 
 156. Id. 
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plaintiffs to incorporate every allegation of every claim into every other claim. 
We cannot give effect to this attempted cross-incorporation.”157 The case, 
however, was not dismissed: the court granted a motion for more definite 
statement and for separate statements.158 The stunt was probably never tried 
again. 
But the current practice is exactly to mechanically incorporate everything 
into everything. The practice of “shotgun pleading” is what lawyers do every 
day.159 Had the plaintiff directly incorporated everything into everything, as 
pleaders customarily do now, instead of being hesitant to reserve the 
incorporation to whatever appears necessary, there would probably have been 
no objection. 
If this Article is unsuccessful in banishing incorporation by reference 
altogether from our pleadings, at least it may convince lawyers to include the 
formula only once in a pleading. 
G.  STATUTORY PROVISION OF INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE 
As we have seen, incorporation by reference has been a feature of common-
law pleading for centuries. It was later adopted by the practice of code pleading, 
even without express statutory permission. 
The first written statute to expressly allow incorporation by reference was 
the New York Rules of Civil Practice enacted in 1920: 
The allegations contained in a separately numbered paragraph of one cause of 
action, counterclaim or defense may be incorporated as a whole in another cause 
of action, counterclaim or defense in the same pleading by reference without 
otherwise repeating them.160 
The rule was born outdated. As we will see below, England had abolished 
the practice of incorporation by reference seventy years earlier.161 
H.  INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
The dogma of complete counts also operated in criminal procedure: “Each 
count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment.”162 Each 
count in an indictment had to be complete—it had to stand by itself and the 
omissions of fact in one count could not be aided by another, absent express 
reference.163 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 774. 
 159. See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1326 (discussing courts’ displeasure with shotgun 
pleading). 
 160. N.Y. CODE CIV. PRAC. § 90 (1921).  
 161. See Subpart IV.A. 
 162. See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932); see also Selvester v. United States, 170 U.S. 262, 
267 (1898) (“Each count is in fact and theory a separate indictment . . . .”). 
 163. See, e.g., King v. Westly (1725) 93 Eng. Rep. 154; Sess. Cas. 152; Phillips v. Fielding (1792) 126 Eng. 
Rep. 464, 469; 2 H. Bl. 123, 131 (referring to an earlier criminal case); Frazier v. Felton, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 231 
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Therefore, a similar practice of incorporation by reference existed in the 
past and still exists in criminal proceedings.164 The formula is ubiquitous in 
formbooks.165 Despite not adopting the dogma of complete counts, the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, enacted in 1944, specifically provided for 
incorporation by reference: “A count may incorporate by reference an allegation 
made in another count.”166  
IV.  THE MODERN PERSPECTIVE  
(NO NEED TO REALLEGE FACTS IN EACH COUNT) 
A.  ENGLAND ABOLISHED THE DOGMA IN 1852 
The dogma of complete counts with incorporation by reference made sense 
in the legal mindset of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, but it sounds 
primitive to a twenty-first century lawyer. 
It sounded primitive in the nineteenth century as well. Indeed, the old 
practice ended in England in the mid-nineteenth century with the enactment of 
 
(1820); Sampson v. Commonwealth, 5 Watts & Serg. 385 (Pa. 1843); Commonwealth v. Clapp, 82 Mass. (16 
Gray) 237 (1860); People v. Graves, 5 Park. 134, 140 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1860) (“It is the constant practice in 
criminal pleading, in one count of an indictment to refer to matters in a previous count, and it has been decided 
that this is proper . . . .”); State v. Lea, 41 Tenn. (1 Cold.) 175 (1860); People v. Danahy, 18 N.Y.S. 467 (Gen. 
Term 1892); Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308 (1894); Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 633 (1896); 
Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 531, 534 (1915); United States v. Segelman, 86 F. Supp. 114, 
126 (W.D. Pa. 1949) (“It would be a travesty on justice if the defendant were exonerated from the penalties of 
the federal law for technical reasons.”); United States. v. Apex Distrib. Co., 148 F. Supp. 365, 370 (D.R.I. 1957); 
United States v. Knox Coal Co., 347 F.2d 33, 38 (3d Cir. 1965) (“Of course, unless the charging part of a 
conspiracy count specifically refers to or incorporates by reference allegations which appear under the heading 
of the overt acts, resort to those allegations may not be had to supply the insufficiency in the charging language 
itself.”); United States v. Knowles, 29 F.3d 947, 952 (5th Cir. 1994) (“While it is true that an allegation made in 
one count of an indictment may be incorporated by reference in another count of the indictment, . . . any such 
incorporation must be expressly done.” (citation omitted)); see also 1 CHITTY, supra note 111, at 169 (1819) 
(“[T]hough every count should appear upon the face of it, to charge the defendant with a different offence, yet 
one count may refer to matter in any other count so as to avoid unnecessary repetition.”); 2 JOSEPH GABBETT, A 
TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 248 (Dublin, J. Cumming 1835); 1 BISHOP, supra note 111, § 182 (1866); 
WHARTON, supra note 136, §§ 298–99 (1880); see also the forms in FRANCIS WHARTON, PRECEDENTS OF 
INDICTMENTS AND PLEAS 10, 38, 50, 54 (Philadelphia, James Kay, Jun. & Brother 1849); FRANK O. LOVELAND, 
FORMS OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1894). 
 164. See 1 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 123, nn.8–9 (4th ed. 2018) (“Although allegations made in 
one count may be incorporated by reference into other counts, each count must be evaluated separately.”). In 
previous editions, this book contained a more rigid statement: “[E]ach count is considered as if it were a separate 
indictment and must be sufficient without reference to other counts unless they are expressly incorporated by 
reference.” See 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 123, at 349 (4th ed. 1982) 
(footnote omitted). 
 165. See, e.g., 3 F. LEE BAILEY & KENNETH J. FISHMAN, COMPLETE MANUAL OF CRIMINAL FORMS § 114:13 
(3d ed. 2018) (“16. [The claimant] repeats and reavers Paragraphs 1 through 15 of his Answer to Complaint for 
Forfeiture as if expressly rewritten and set forth herein.” (alteration in original)); 8 WISCONSIN PLEADING AND 
PRACTICE FORMS § 73:15 (5th ed. 2018) (“[D]efendant here repeats and restates all the matters alleged in the 
previous defense . . . .”). 
 166. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c). 
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the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852, which abolished the forms of action167 
and made joinder of claims flexible.168 The English procedural reforms at the 
time were part of the same intellectual environment that led to code pleading in 
the United States after 1848, although the English reforms were more successful 
in simplifying the rules of pleading and joinder.169 
By 1876, English judges had realized something that Americans had not: 
that the dogma of complete counts was just an annoyance, and that it led to an 
attack on the way the pleading was written, not on the merits of the case.170 A 
legal publication of the time transcribed an amusing dialogue between judges on 
the Queen’s Bench Division calling this practice “niggling demurrers” and 
“ridiculous.”171 
The dogma, together with incorporation by reference, was formally 
interred in England by two cases from 1875 and 1876, one about a complaint 
and the other about an answer. In Watson v. Hawkins, the court held that a 
plaintiff need not assign a specific fact to a specific count; it was enough that 
any paragraph in a pleading supported one or more claims.172 A plaintiff needed 
merely to state all material facts and then ask for relief.173 In Nathan v. 
 
 167. Common Law Procedure Act 1852, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, § 3 (Eng.) (“It shall not be necessary to mention 
any form or cause of action in any writ of summons, or in any notice of writ of summons [], issued under the 
authority of this Act.”). 
 168. Id. § 41 (“Causes of action, of whatever kind, provided they be by and against the same parties [] and 
in the same rights, may be joined in the same suit . . . but the court or a judge shall have power to prevent the 
trial of different causes of action together, if such trial would be inexpedient, and in such case such court or 
judge may order separate records to be made up, and separate trials to be had.”). 
 169. See HEPBURN, supra note 25, at 173–283 (extensively discussing the English procedural reforms of 
1852, 1854, 1860, 1873, and 1875, how they were influenced by code pleading, and how they later influenced 
procedural reform in the United States). 
 170. See Watson v. Hawkins (1875) 24 WLR 884 (Eng.); Queen’s Bench Division, LAW TIMES, May 27, 
1876, at 67 (Eng.). This was not a novel idea even at the time. On an unrelated matter, more than a century 
earlier, Matthew Bacon had said, “the judge[s] ought to judge upon the substance, and not upon the manner or 
form of pleading.” See 4 BACON, supra note 20, at H3. 
 171. See Queen’s Bench Division, supra note 170, at 67. This dialogue may have occurred during the 
deliberation of Nathan v. Batchelor [1876] QB 164, 165 (Eng.). 
 172. Watson, 24 WLR at 884 (“If the facts stated in any paragraph demurred to can by any construction be 
considered as supporting any one of the various reliefs claimed in the pleadings, the paragraph must be held 
good.”); see also L.G. Gordon Robbins, Quarterly Digest of All Reported Cases, 4 LAW MAG. & REV. 727, 749 
(1876) (Eng.); CHARLES BURNEY ET AL., WILSON’S PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE 217 
(London, Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 7th ed. 1888) (Eng.); M.D. CHALMERS & HERBERT LUSH-WILSON, WILSON’S 
SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACTS 254, 279 (London, Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 3d ed. 1882) (Eng.); WILLIAM 
THOS. CHARLEY, THE NEW SYSTEM OF PRACTICE AND PLEADING UNDER THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE 
ACTS, 1873 & 1875, at 549–50 (London, Waterlow & Sons 1875) (Eng.); JOHN CUNNINGHAM & MILES WALKER 
MATTINSON, A SELECTION OF PRECEDENTS OF PLEADING 39–40 (London, Stevens & Haynes 1878) (Eng.); cf. 
Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Tr. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that with 
imprecise incorporation by reference, “it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended 
to support which claim(s) for relief”). The American perspective, demanding a party to assign a specific fact to 
a specific count, is the exact opposite of the 1875 English decision, 120 years earlier. 
 173. Watson, 24 WLR at 884; cf. Stewart v. Balderston, 10 Kan. 131, 133–34 (1872) (a contemporaneous 
American case concluding that the lawyer was not allowed to allege the general facts initially without stating 
separately in each count which fact constituted each cause of action). 
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Batchelor, the court held that a plaintiff could not challenge an isolated 
paragraph if the answer, taken together, presented a good defense.174 Both 
decisions justified their conclusions on the Common Law Procedure Act of 
1852, although the Act itself was silent on the issue. 
As William Charley noticed in 1877, “This decision [Nathan] is clearly in 
accordance with common sense. Order XIX, Rule 4, requires that ‘every 
pleading shall be divided into paragraphs.’ It would be absurd if the opposite 
party were allowed to pick out any particular paragraph and say, ‘This 
paragraph, standing alone, is insufficient in law.’”175 Almost 150 years have 
passed, and this common sense is still lacking in the United States. 
The dogma and incorporation by reference, therefore, have not existed in 
England for almost two centuries.176 The United States badly need their own 
Watson and Nathan.177 
Ireland178 and Ontario179 soon followed the new English precedent. The 
United States did not pay attention to it, even though Watson v. Hawkins was 
 
 174. Nathan, [1876] QB at 164; see also FRANK EVANS, THE PRACTICE OF THE CHANCERY DIVISION OF THE 
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE 720 (London, Horace Cox 1881). 
 175. CHARLEY, supra note 172, at 549 (emphasis omitted). According to Order XIX, Rule 4 of the Rules of 
Court, every pleading had to be “divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively, and each paragraph 
containing, as nearly as may be, a separate allegation.” Id. at 491. This is a familiar rule for American lawyers.  
 176. See NEIL ANDREWS, ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE: FUNDAMENTALS OF THE NEW CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
§§ 10.54–10.89 (2003) (Eng.); BULLEN & LEAKE & JACOB’S PRECEDENTS OF PLEADINGS (William Blair et al. 
eds., 18th ed. 2016) (Eng.); ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, ZUCKERMAN ON CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICE 
§§ 7.16–7.20 (3d ed. 2013) (Eng.). See generally ATKIN’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COURT FORMS IN CIVIL 
PROCEEDINGS, LexisNexis UK (Judge Philip Waller et al. eds., 2011) (comprising over eighty volumes). None 
of these books refer to Watson, Nathan, or to incorporation by reference. For further commentary on the 
nonexistence of the dogma and incorporation by reference in England, see Email from Peter Susman, QC, 
Barrister, Henderson Chambers, to Antonio Gidi, Professor of Law, Syracuse University (Jan. 9, 2019) (on file 
with author) (“In 50 years of practice at the English Bar, I have never seen a pleading in a civil case divided into 
counts, or repeating in the same terms earlier allegations of fact in relation to further alleged causes of action. 
Indeed, I remember that when I spent 18 months as an associate with [a law firm] in New York City in 1970–
[7]1, I was surprised at what I regarded as the excessive formality, prolixity and repetitiveness of the pleadings 
I saw.”). 
 177. See generally MILLAR, supra note 12, at 175 (“The American codes have not succeeded as well as the 
English Rules in reducing pleading to that purely ancillary position which it ought to occupy in the procedural 
scheme. There is commonly too strong an insistence upon the exactness of statement in the allegation of cause 
of action and defense . . . . The test of prejudice worked to the opponent of the party at fault is too apt to be 
overridden by considerations of the regularity of the record . . . . [I]t is still possible for a judgment to be reversed 
by an appellate court because of a fault in the pleadings alone, without regard to the evidence or to the question 
of prejudice vel non to the opposite party. The English system, in contrast, has virtually attained the position that 
a fault in pleading, however substantial, will not be permitted to affect the result if it has produced no actual 
injury . . . . Hence, if a party’s claim or defense is supported by the evidence, he has little to fear from slips in 
his pleadings, for in practical effect everything depends on the case made at the trial.”). 
 178. See O’Grady v. Warden [1878] 12 Ir. LTR 150 (Ir.); L. S. EIFFE ET AL., THE JUDICATURE ACTS 
(IRELAND), 1877 AND 1878, at 350 (Dublin, E. Ponsonby 1881). 
 179. See GEORGE SMITH HOLMESTED & THOMAS LANGTON, THE JUDICATURE ACT OF ONTARIO AND THE 
CONSOLIDATED RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 434, 456, 461–62 (Toronto, Carswell Co. Ltd. 2d ed. 
1898); see also GEORGE SMITH HOLMESTED & THOMAS LANGTON, FORMS AND PRECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS 
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known and could have influenced American lawyers to adopt a more enlightened 
practice.180 
The dogma and incorporation by reference, therefore, do not exist in 
Canada.181 Current Ontario Rule 25.02, for example, requires pleadings to be 
divided into consecutively numbered paragraphs, with each allegation contained 
in a separate paragraph.182 This is similar to American rules and practice. But it 
does not require each count to be complete.183 Nowhere in the Ontario Rules is 
incorporation by reference mentioned. The same is true in Canadian federal 
courts.184 
The practice does not exist in New Zealand or Australia either.185 A judge 
of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, probably exasperated by American lawyers 
or local lawyers consulting American legal forms on the Internet, offers the 
following advice: 
Don’t use the expression the plaintiff or the defendant “relies on and repeats the 
facts pleaded at paragraphs 2–10.” Your pleading needs to set out the material 
facts, and once they are pleaded there is no need to plead them again. And you 
actually never will, quite literally, wish them repeated.186 
An exception might be the common-law systems directly derived from the 
American legal tradition or heavily influenced by American lawyers. For 
example, although the Rules of Court of the Philippines do not mention 
incorporation by reference, lawyers in the Philippines repeat and reallege at each 
count. This practice, however, is fading away with each new generation of 
lawyers.187 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR ONTARIO AND THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 52–262 (1904) 
(formbook showing that the practice had stopped in Ontario). 
 180. See AMES, supra note 108, at 33 (citing Watson v. Hawkins (1875) 24 WLR 884 (Eng.), but making 
no comment on the issue of incorporation by reference). This forgotten English precedent is still cited in at least 
one common-law country. See JOSEPH MBAH-NDAM, A TEXTBOOK ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL AND 
COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN THE HIGH COURTS OF THE NORTH-WEST AND SOUTH-WEST PROVINCES OF 
CAMEROON 317 & n.70 (2003). 
 181. See GARY D. WATSON & MICHAEL MCGOWAN, WATSON & MCGOWAN’S ONTARIO CIVIL PRACTICE: 
2019 (2018) (making no reference to incorporation by reference); see also Email from Janet Walker, Professor 
& Chartered Arbitrator, Osgoode Hall Law Sch., to Antonio Gidi (Jan. 4, 2019) (on file with author) (“You are 
right that incorporation by reference is something that is not done in Canada and is a particularly unattractive 
feature of U.S. procedure. It’s been gone for so long that there is no reference in the standard 
commentaries . . . on the history of its elimination. . . . But rest assured, the practice ended a very long time 
ago.”). 
 182. Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, r 25.02 (Can.). 
 183. See id. 
 184. See Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, c 173 (Can.) (requiring only that “[p]leadings shall be divided 
into consecutively numbered paragraphs”). 
 185. The New Zealand High Court Rules of 2016 do not mention incorporation by reference. See High Court 
Rules 2016, pt 5 (N.Z.). 
 186. See Hon. Stephen Estcourt, Pleadings Tips and Traps, SUP. CT. TAS. (June 29, 2015), 
https://www.supremecourt.tas.gov.au/publications/speeches/estcourt_j/pleading_tips_and_tricks. 
 187. See Email from Vanessa Joyce Monge, CEO & Legal Counsel, Inceptigon Pty. Ltd., to Antonio Gidi, 
Professor of Law, Syracuse University (Feb. 12, 2019, 8:57 AM) (on file with author). 
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It is impossible to know the pleading practice of all countries of the civil-
law tradition (derived from Roman Law and later adopted in all Continental 
Europe and Latin America and most of Africa and Asia). But the dogma and 
incorporation by reference do not exist in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Brazil, 
Argentina, Japan, Mexico, Colombia, or any other country with a similar 
tradition.188 This unpleasant feature is strictly American. 
Although this fossilized technique has no place in modern pleadings, 
American lawyers continue to parrot it, blindly complying with a ghost dogma 
that has not existed for almost a century in the United States. This is no surprise. 
As Sunderland said a century ago, on an unrelated matter: 
It is safe to say that if a new method of treating cancer were discovered and 
successfully employed in England; every intelligent doctor in the world would 
almost immediately know about it and attempt to take advantage of it. But it is 
equally safe to say that if a new and successful method of treating some 
procedural problem were discovered in England, American lawyers as a class 
would remain in substantial ignorance of it for at least two generations, and would 
probably treat it with scornful indifference for a generation or two more. There 
are no state lines for progressive doctors, dentists, engineers, architects, 
manufacturers or business men. But not one lawyer in a hundred knows or cares 
what reforms are being employed by his profession on the other side of the 
political boundary. The American lawyer is satisfied with things as they are. As 
long as clients continue to come and the machinery of the law continues to 
move . . . .189 
In retrospect, Sunderland was charitable. Here we are, twelve generations 
after incorporation by reference was abolished in England, and nothing has 
changed in the United States. This Article is not exactly about the cure for 
cancer, but the need to end incorporation by reference is something on which all 
lawyers can agree. 
B.  NEW YORK ABOLISHED INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE IN 1962, BUT IT 
SURVIVED 
Only in 1962, more than a century after the practice was abolished in 
England and in other common-law countries, New York expressly released 
pleaders from the ancient burden of pleading complete counts: 
Prior statements in a pleading shall be deemed repeated or adopted subsequently 
in the same pleading whenever express repetition or adoption is unnecessary for 
a clear presentation of the subsequent matters.190 
 
 188. See generally UGO MATTEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA & ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW 
489–563, 684–862 (2009) (discussing comparative civil procedure). 
 189. Sunderland, supra note 12, at 572, 579 (stating that with the end of the forms of actions the restrictions 
on joinder of claims should have ended as well, but “the framers of the code were still unable to free themselves 
from the common law tradition”). 
 190. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3014 (McKinney 2018); see also 5 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 62, 
¶¶ 3014.04–.07; 3B LISA A. ZAKOLSKI & JUDITH NICHTER MORRIS, CARMODY-WAIT 2D NEW YORK PRACTICE 
WITH FORMS § 27:44 (2019). 
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The New York rule just deemed previous statements repeated or adopted, 
so it abolished incorporation by reference while at least implicitly keeping the 
dogma. Instead of deeming the statements repeated, however, the rule should 
have abolished the dogma, providing that there was no need to repeat statements. 
Moreover, the previous sentence undercuts the release from the burden by 
stating, “Reference to and incorporation of allegations may subsequently be by 
number.”191 
Although imperfect, this language represented a major evolution of the 
previous pleading practice of repeating, reiterating, and realleging. The legal 
profession received the new language with high hope: “[it] eliminates any need 
for the standard paragraph found in pleadings . . . which stated that the pleader 
‘repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraph.’”192 If 
it had been properly interpreted, this rule would have buried the old practice of 
incorporation by reference half a century ago. Still a century later than England, 
but good enough. 
Less than a year after its enactment, this provision was put to the test in 
Hewitt v. Maass.193 The court settled the issue in two sentences: “There is an 
objection made [by the defendant] to the failure of the complaint to repeat 
allegations in describing the several causes of action. This essentially formal 
reaction was recognized as such recently and has been disposed of by [CPLR 
Rule 3014].”194 It seemed that the future of that provision was auspicious and 
that the old practice of repeating, reiterating, and realleging would become a 
mere curiosity, finally archived in the dustbin of the history of impractical rules. 
A few years later, however, CPLR Rule 3014 was challenged again in 
Nussenblatt v. Nussenblatt, this time with mixed results.195 A defendant’s 
counterclaim failed to reallege essential allegations already made in previous 
paragraphs of the same pleading. The plaintiff moved to dismiss the incomplete 
counterclaim because without these allegations the counterclaim did not state a 
cause of action. The court denied the motion to dismiss, arguing that the new 
language overruled old cases like Latman v. Kalmor Builders, Inc., decided 
before the new rules.196  
In Latman, the court, although recognizing that the matters were pleaded 
in the first cause of action, demanded that they be incorporated by reference in 
the second one and ordered the plaintiff to amend the complaint.197 Nussenblatt 
also favorably cited commentators who said that the new Rule 3014 made 
standard paragraphs repeating and realleging unnecessary. Yet Nussenblatt 
 
 191. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3014 (McKinney 2018). 
 192. Nussenblatt v. Nussenblatt, 309 N.Y.S.2d 397, 399 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting an earlier version of 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 62, ¶ 3014.07). 
 193. 246 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 
 194. Id. at 672.  
 195. Nussenblatt, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 397. 
 196. Id. at 399.  
 197. Latman v. Kalmor Builders, Inc., 137 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
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issued the same order as Latman: that the defendant amend the answer to repeat 
and reallege the missing elements “[w]ith regard to clarity and in order to 
remove any doubt as to the pleading in future proceedings.”198 It was the classic, 
“you don’t need to do it, but do it.” And just like that, New York was wrenched 
back, over 400 years, to the sixteenth century. And it never recovered. 
For one commentator, repeating and realleging is still necessary in New 
York, “in a long pleading in which so much has intervened between the original 
statement and the new reference that the content would be lost without the 
repetition.”199 Another treatise offers a defeating interpretation of CPLR Rule 
3014, suggesting that it encourages incorporation by reference in a small 
complaint with a handful of paragraphs for a “clear presentation.”200 
Another treatise, after praising the New York rule, cautioned: “the pleader 
must exercise judgment in deciding whether an express reference or adoption is 
necessary. If there is any doubt that prior allegations in the pleadings will be 
considered repeated or adopted, an express incorporation would be the safest 
approach.”201 They concluded that “[a]s a practical matter, the majority of 
attorneys still opt to use the obsolete but nonetheless comfortably precise 
technique of reallegation by reference to prior material in succeeding 
paragraphs, although this practice is to be discouraged.”202 Except for the word 
“obsolete,” there’s nothing correct in this statement. Incorporation by reference 
is neither comfortable nor precise; and it is a tic, not a technique. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, despite the express rule relieving pleaders from 
the burden of repeating and realleging, New York lawyers are still addicted to 
the practice, routinely incorporating previous statements by reference. There is 
no incentive for a lawyer to think independently, when the most prestigious 
commentators say that incorporating by reference is necessary in some cases, 
the “safest approach” in others, and a “comfortably precise technique.”203 
But the dogma of complete counts is incompatible with a modern system 
of procedure, with broad amendment rules,204 where “[p]leadings shall be 
liberally construed,”205 where “[d]efects shall be ignored if a substantial right of 
 
 198. Nussenblatt, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 398–400.  
 199. PATRICK M. CONNORS, PRACTICE COMMENTARY, MCKINNEY’S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK, 
CPLR C3014:5 (2015). 
 200. See DAVID D. SIEGEL & PATRICK M. CONNORS, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 213 (6th ed. 2018). 
 201. 5 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 62, ¶ 3014.07. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See, e.g., Card v. Budini, 285 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737 (App. Div. 1967) (holding that the incorporation of 
allegations in a complaint in a previous proceeding was improper, but the plaintiff was allowed to amend her 
complaint). 
 205. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3026 (McKinney 2018). 
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a party is not prejudiced,”206 and where objections of form are waivable.207 This 
all happened in New York in 2019, almost two centuries after it was abolished 
in England. 
Old practices die hard. American lawyers may not be ready to let go of this 
ritual. 
This practice had a similarly disappointing evolution in Illinois, which is 
the only other state that has a peculiar rule on incorporation by reference, that is 
not a copy of Federal Rule 10(c). The Illinois Code provides that 
[i]f facts are adequately stated in one part of a pleading, or in any one pleading, 
they need not be repeated elsewhere in the pleading, or in the pleadings, and may 
be incorporated by reference elsewhere or in other pleadings.208 
The language of the Illinois rule is confusing but, well interpreted, might 
address the issue adequately, abolishing incorporation by reference. Properly 
interpreted, it is superior to the New York rule because it rejects the fiction that 
the facts are “deemed repeated” in the subsequent count. Obviously, if the facts 
are adequately stated in one part of a pleading, there is no reason to repeat them 
elsewhere in the same pleading. But what the precision of the first sentence 
gives, the ambiguity of the second takes away. Although the second sentence 
refers to other pleadings and documents, its ambiguous language encourages the 
practice that the first sentence had considered unnecessary. The result is that 
lawyers in Illinois continue to employ the useless formula in all their pleadings, 
and the formbooks do not allow them to evolve.209 
Several courts have noticed something strange with incorporation by 
reference, but they are incapable of seeing exactly what is wrong with it. Courts 
dislike, for example, “chain letters” or “shotgun pleadings” that cumulatively 
incorporate by reference all facts in previous claims, whether relevant or not: by 
count ten, count one was alleged nine times.210 The dissatisfaction, however, is 
 
 206. Id. According to the Advisory Committee Note, this rule is intended to “discourage useless pleading 
attacks by placing the burden on the attacker to show prejudice.” Id. advisory committee note. The same rule 
existed in all other New York procedural statutes. This principle has been a constant feature of New York and 
American law for at least a century. See N.Y. CODE PROC. § 136 (1848) (“In the construction of a pleading, for 
the purpose of determining its effect, its allegation shall be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice 
between the parties.”); N.Y. CODE CIV. PROC. § 519 (1877) (“The allegations of a pleading must be liberally 
construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”); N.Y. R. CIV. PRAC. § 275 (1920) (“Pleadings 
must be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”). Other states had similar 
rules. See 1 ESTEE, supra note 20, at 153–54 (citing the codes of California, Nevada, Idaho, and Arizona, as well 
as case law in several other states); see also Dempsey v. Willett, 23 Hun. 264, 265 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1878). 
 207. See 5 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 62, ¶ 3014.10 (“If a responsive pleading has been 
served, the party serving it normally should be considered to have waived his right to object to a failure to state 
and number separately. This follows naturally from the premise that the prime justification for the requirement 
is to enable the opposing party to respond intelligently.”). 
 208. ILL. COMP. STAT. CT. R. 134 (2018). 
 209. See, e.g., 3A ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE FORMS § 64:4 (2018); 5A id. § 112:21; 5 ILLINOIS REAL 
PROPERTY SERVICE § 33:124 (2018). 
 210. See, e.g., Uhrich v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 131, 135–36 (Ct. App. 2003); Kelly 
v. Gen. Tel. Co., 186 Cal. Rptr. 184, 187 (Ct. App. 1982); Frugoli v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 464 So. 2d 1292, 
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only manifested in complex cases, when the pleading is ambiguous or 
incomplete despite multiple amendments; the dissatisfaction is not caused 
merely by imperfect incorporation by reference. Courts have shown their 
displeasure with tough words and no action.211 
American lawyers are stuck in a revolving door, unable to modernize on 
their own. One reason why American law is vulnerable to this kind of hopeless 
situation is the tradition, both in academia and in practice, of citing only the most 
recent case or authority and ignoring the original one.212 A rule appears more 
current than it is when one cites a recent case. If American jurisprudence 
preserved the origin of their precedents, it would be easier to know why a rule 
exists. 
C.  THE FEDERAL RULES DID NOT ADOPT THE DOGMA IN 1938, BUT KEPT 
THE EXCEPTION 
Federal procedure has not caught up with New York’s 1962 innovation. In 
a pointless provision that has survived unamended since 1938, Rule 10(c) 
condones the practice of incorporation by reference: “A statement in a pleading 
may be adopted by reference elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other 
pleading or motion.”213 
Rule 10(c) allows but does not require incorporation by reference. The 
Federal Rules, then, mindlessly adopted the exception (incorporation by 
 
1293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see also Alpert v. Hein, 166 N.Y.S.2d 851, 853 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Rubinstein v. 
Rubinstein, 61 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (same); Stoll v. Long Islander Publ’g Co., 40 N.Y.S.2d 412, 413 
(Sup. Ct. 1942) (striking out irrelevant incorporation by reference). 
 211. See, e.g., Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F.3d 1350, 1356 n.9 (11th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Bridge v. 
Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008); Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 
1320–21 (11th Cir. 2015); see also 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1326 (2018) (discussing courts’ 
displeasure with shotgun pleading). But see Degirmenci v. Sapphire-Fort Lauderdale, LLLP, 693 F. Supp. 2d 
1325 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (dismissing sua sponte a confusing shotgun pleading after a fourth amended complaint 
did not follow the court order to clearly state the facts of each violation and separate counts for each violation, 
violating Rule 8(a)(2)’s short and plain statement requirement, yet allowing the plaintiff to amend and plead a 
sixth time); Strategic Income Fund, LLC v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(“Instead of requiring the plaintiffs to replead, the [trial] court attempted—and admirably so—to ascertain 
exactly which facts formed the basis of the plaintiffs’ federal law claims. We have read Count IV—including all 
that it incorporates by reference—several times; yet, we must confess that we are at a loss to explain what 
allegedly transpired . . . .”); Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1128–31 (11th Cir. 2001), abrogation recognized 
by Jackson v. Bank of Am., 898 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 212. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING 
JUDGES 54 (2008) (“The more recent the citation the better. The judge wants to know whether the judgment you 
seek will be affirmed by the current court, not whether it would have been affirmed 30 years ago.”); MICHAEL 
D. MURRAY & CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS 107 (2009) (“Recent authorities are 
better.”); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. & KRISTEN KONRAD TISCIONE, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING 
278 (7th ed. 2013) (“If an idea is undisputed and routine . . . it should be enough to cite, with little or no 
explanation, the most recent decision”); see also THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.4, at 
61–62 (20th ed. 2015) (stating that, generally, cases should be cited in reverse chronological order). 
 213. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1) (adopted in 1944) (“A count may incorporate 
by reference an allegation made in another count.”). 
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reference)214 without ever having adopted the dogma (each count must contain 
all facts and elements of the claim).215 
This rule was born outdated, inconsistent with a modern procedural system 
of notice pleading that discouraged pleading battles, with the attendant reduced 
importance of pleadings,216 judicial discretion, liberal construction of 
pleadings,217 flexible amendments,218 search for substantial justice, and liberal 
joinder of claims.219 Most important, it was incompatible with a system that did 
not adopt the old common-law or code pleading dogma requiring each count to 
be complete and independent under penalty of dismissal.220 
By the 1940s, the dogma had practically disappeared in federal courts: the 
few cases that mentioned incorporation by reference did not mention the dogma 
of complete counts.221 No case has expressly abolished the dogma, but this is the 
wrong perspective. No case expressly adopted it; no case forced a plaintiff to 
amend a complaint to repeat allegations or dismissed a claim for failure to 
incorporate. 
Moreover, Rule 10(b) does not require joint claims to be “separately 
stated.”222 A party may do so if it “would promote clarity.”223 As stated in a 
treatise, 
Unfortunately, no easy rule can be extracted from the cases to advise a pleader as 
to when separate paragraphs—or how many—will be necessary. A reliance on 
common sense and a conscientious effort to produce a pleading that is readily 
comprehensible to the opposing litigant and the district court are the best guides 
for a pleader to follow. Separate paragraphing is particularly useful when . . . . 
Even if separate counts for each ground are not required under the circumstances 
under the third sentence of Rule 10(b), the clarity of the pleadings will be 
enhanced by the use of separate paragraphs.224 
 
 214. See supra Part III. 
 215. See supra Part II. 
 216. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d) (“No technical form [of pleading] is required.”). 
 217. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). 
 218. See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1326 (“Leave to amend the pleading to correct a defective 
incorporation should be granted liberally.”). 
 219. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a) (“A party . . . may join . . . as many claims as it has against an opposing 
party.”), with Sunderland, supra note 12, at 572 (discussing arcane rules of common-law joinder of claims, and 
the severe consequences for misjoinder). 
 220. Cf. Sutton v. United States, 157 F.2d 661, 663 (5th Cir. 1946) (stating, on an unrelated criminal matter, 
that “[i]t is no longer necessary in the federal courts to follow the old common-law rules of criminal pleadings”). 
 221. See, e.g., Aktiebolaget Stille-Werner v. Stille-Scanlan, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (ordering 
the defendant to state with particularity which of the allegations in the answer were to be incorporated into the 
counterclaim, without saying why it was necessary); Rosenberg v. Cohen, 9 F.R.D. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1949). 
 222. See Subpart II.A (discussing the meaning of “separately stated” as an obligation to allege all elements 
of the cause of action in each count). 
 223. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b) (“If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction 
or occurrence—and each defense other than a denial—must be stated in a separate count or defense.”). 
 224. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1322 (“Because the motion to direct a party to paragraph a 
pleading properly often is employed only as a dilatory tactic, a district court should direct a pleader to paragraph 
only when the existing form of the pleading is prejudicial or renders the framing of an appropriate response 
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Without the dogma of complete counts, incorporation by reference became 
a ghost obligation in federal courts: an exception without a rule. 
The intellectual environment in the years leading to the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 was the second wasted opportunity in 
the United States to abolish incorporation by reference.225 The first had occurred 
almost a century earlier, with the enactment of the NY Code of Procedure in 
1848. In fact, the 1938 Federal Rules were an even greater departure from the 
technicalities of common-law pleading than code pleading could ever be.226 Yet, 
although rare, some recent cases still mention incorporation by reference, but 
always without mentioning the dogma of complete counts. This Article starts the 
third opportunity to abolish incorporation by reference. 
Only one (reasonably) recent federal court case took the dogma of 
complete counts seriously, with tragic consequences for the plaintiff. In 1960, 
60 years ago, a federal district court judge in New Jersey paid careful attention 
to which allegations were and which were not being incorporated in each count. 
He held that because the plaintiff incorporated certain earlier allegations into a 
count, the non-incorporation of other allegations demonstrated an intent not to 
make them a part of it.227 The judge then granted a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.228 
This was probably the last decision where incorporation by reference was 
seriously considered, albeit indirectly. Although this decision is from 1960, the 
judge had graduated from law school in 1919 and was in private practice from 
1919 to 1932, when he was nominated to the federal bench by President Herbert 
Hoover.229 Clearly, he was an old-school judge. 
Another recent federal court decision also paid indirect attention to the 
issue. Although not referring to the dogma of complete counts, and although 
stating that Rule 10(c) permits incorporation by reference, Zuzul seems to 
consider that a plaintiff must do so if she wants to allege the same fact in a 
 
extremely difficult or would be of assistance to the district judge. Even when a failure to comply with Rule 10(b) 
is shown, leave to amend ought to be made available to the offending pleader since the defect does not go to the 
merits of the action. A failure to object to improper paragraphing promptly—normally before interposing a 
responsive pleading—properly has been deemed a waiver of the defect by at least one court of appeals. 
Fortunately, practice under this technical aspect of Rule 10(b) has not been the subject of significant litigation, 
especially in recent decades.”); see also id. § 1324 (discussing when separate statements are required); Lowe v. 
Consol. Edison Co., 1 F.R.D. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (holding that separate counts were not required because they 
were not necessary to clear presentation or to enable defendants to plead). 
 225. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 103 (discussing the movement of flexibilization of the common law 
pleading towards equity pleading in the Federal Rules). 
 226. See id. at 974 (“The Federal Rules were the antithesis of the common law . . . .”). 
 227. Reliable Volkswagen Sales & Serv. Co. v. World-Wide Auto. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 412, 425 (D.N.J. 
1960). 
 228. Id. at 428. 
 229. Judges: Forman, Phillip, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/forman-phillip (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2019). A curiosity, if not irony, is that Judge Phillip Forman granted Albert Einstein his 
American citizenship in 1940. 
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different count.230 With no context or explanation, the court stated, “For one, 
these allegations arise in [the plaintiff’s] defamation count and are not 
incorporated into her counts for race or gender retaliation.”231 Although dictum, 
this comment reveals a dangerously wrong interpretation of Rule 10(c). 
Federal Rule 10(c) was mimicked in almost all state procedural rules, 
replicating the error throughout the country. Only New York and Illinois adopted 
different rules, as discussed above.232 Forty-three states adopted provisions 
similar to Rule 10(c), with minimal variation. The most common language is 
“Statements in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the 
same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion.” A few states were more 
creative in departing from Rule 10(c) and used “document” or “paper” instead 
of “pleading,” clarified that it must be “in the same action,” or added a reference 
to “exhibits” or “other paper of record.” Only five states (Virginia, New 
Hampshire, Iowa, Connecticut, and California) did not adopt the rule in their 
codes of civil procedure but allow incorporation by reference through 
precedents.233 
No state has expressly adopted the dogma of complete counts in modern 
procedural law.234 One would have to go back more than half a century, to the 
1960s and 1950s to find a handful of isolated cases clearly stating the dogma of 
complete counts, maybe by inertia.235 One would be hard-pressed to find any 
reference to the dogma after that. Cases before 1950, and especially before 1940, 
state the dogma unequivocally.236 So, by following the federal lead, the states 
also adopted the exception to a dogma that they had abandoned.237 
 
 230. Zuzul v. McDonald, 98 F. Supp. 3d 852, 869 n.15 (M.D.N.C. 2015). 
 231. Id.; see also Heying v. Simonaitis, 466 N.E.2d 1137, 1142 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (not allowing, without 
explanation, allegations in one count that were not expressly incorporated in another). 
 232. See supra Subpart IV.B. 
 233. See Pine Terrace Apartments, L.P. v. Windscape, LLC, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 630, 641 (Ct. App. 2009); 
Melfi v. City of Danbury, 800 A.2d 582 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Vawter v. McKissick, 159 N.W.2d 538, 541 
(Iowa 1968); Signal Aviation Servs., Inc. v. City of Lebanon, 144 A.3d 869, 879–80 (N.H. 2016); Hechler 
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 S.E.2d 744, 746 (Va. 1985).  
 234. See, e.g., 1 RONALD S. LONGHOFER, MICHIGAN COURT RULES PRACTICE § 2113.4 (6th ed. 2018) 
(“[I]ncorporation by reference was formerly required when identical facts were relied upon in separate counts 
or defenses of the same pleading. Although that is still permitted under MCR 2.113, it is no longer required.”). 
The advice is, “You don’t need to do it, but you may.” 
 235. See Reliable Volkswagen Sales & Serv. Co. v. World-Wide Auto. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 412 (D.N.J. 
1960); Webb v. Litz, 102 So. 2d 915 (Ala. Ct. App. 1958); Lambert v. S. Ctys. Gas Co., 340 P.2d 608, 611–12 
(Cal. 1959) (“Each count or cause of action in a complaint must be complete in itself, and must either contain 
all the averments necessary to state a cause of action or expressly refer therefor to other counts.” (citations 
omitted)); Steiner v. Rowley, 221 P.2d 9, 12 (Cal. 1950) (en banc); Tucker v. Tucker, 143 S.E.2d 639, 644 (Ga. 
1965) (“Each count in the petition must be complete in itself and must state a cause of action.”); S. Land, Timber 
& Pulp Corp. v. Eunice, 133 S.E.2d 345, 350 (Ga. 1963); Latman v. Kalmor Builders, Inc., 137 N.Y.S.2d 240 
(Sup. Ct. 1954); Lampert v. Hollis Music, Inc., 109 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Levine v. Schaffzin, 99 
N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Heath v. Kirkman, 82 S.E.2d 104 (N.C. 1954); Cherry v. Walker, 62 S.E.2d 329, 
(N.C. 1950); Olson v. Johnson, 66 N.W.2d 346 (Wis. 1954). 
 236. See supra Subparts II.A, III.A. 
 237. The practice in New York and Illinois is discussed above. See supra Subpart IV.B. 
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The absence of evolution regarding incorporation by reference is 
discouraging because, as Robert Wyness Millar stated, “as procedure develops 
the advance is from rigidity to flexibility.”238 Against all odds, and against 
reason and common sense, the practice is as prevalent today as it was four 
centuries ago. But at least it made sense in the context of primitive procedural 
superstitions. 
D.  BEYOND INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE 
Some modern courts may be going in a direction beyond the need to 
incorporate by reference. These courts are influenced by the empty existence of 
the practice of incorporation by reference; they are not reinstating the rule that 
all counts must be complete. The result is futile pleading battles and unnecessary 
repetition, fueled by naturally risk-averse lawyers who would adopt a belt-
and-suspenders approach for fear of an unreasonably formalistic judge. 
A 2003 Utah decision, Coroles v. Sabey, held that in fraud cases, the 
requirement to plead with particularity is not satisfied with the incorporation of 
almost 700 previous paragraphs and the mere recital of the elements of fraud.239 
For the court, it was unacceptable for a lengthy complaint to “dump[] upon the 
trial court, and now upon [the court of appeals], the burden of sifting through the 
hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts to ascertain whether Plaintiffs have 
‘allege[d] . . . facts necessary to make all their elements of fraud.’”240 
The Coroles court was also influenced by the rule that “the mere 
recitation . . . of the elements of the fraud in a complaint does not satisfy the 
particularity requirement.”241 To facilitate the court’s work, therefore, the 
plaintiff “should have listed specific paragraphs from their facts section that 
supported each element of their common law fraud claim.”242 This silly idea 
could only have crossed the mind of a judge exposed to the practice of 
incorporation by reference. The case was dismissed without prejudice, and the 
request for leave to amend was denied merely because a proper motion to amend 
was not filed: the plaintiffs should have filed a proper motion to amend or filed 
a new lawsuit complying with the specificity demanded.243 Coroles represents 
the triumph of form over substance. 
 
 238. MILLAR, supra note 12, at 5. This statement is true only regarding the recent evolution of civil 
procedure. Earlier procedure, particularly Roman law, was more flexible and less formalistic than the common 
law. See, e.g., Millar, supra note 90, at 31–43 (demonstrating that the Roman and Canon law rules of joinder of 
claims were more flexible than the common-law pleading rules). 
 239. See Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (“This method for pleading fraud is 
unacceptable under rule 9(b), especially in a complaint of such enormous length.”). 
 240. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995)). 
 241. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. 
Harrison, 70 P.3d 35, 40 (Utah 2003)). 
 242. Id. at 981 n.13. 
 243. See id. at 986. 
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A 2012 decision, also from Utah, reported plaintiffs following Coroles: on 
a 260-page complaint, each count contained not only the traditional formula of 
incorporation by reference, but also a summary of the facts and cross references 
to specific paragraphs giving factual detail to support each element of a fraud 
claim.244 Belt, suspenders, and waistband. 
This practice of summarizing facts at each count and making cross 
references to prior paragraphs might become pervasive even beyond fraud cases, 
as lawyers and courts struggle with the unintended consequences of the 
plausibility requirement of Twombly and Iqbal.245 Unless this is done in rare 
cases of long pleadings and complex facts under a requirement of pleading with 
particularity, this practice will prove even more wasteful and pointless than 
incorporation by reference.246 
And all this nonsense could happen only in the United States, and only 
because the legal profession never got rid of incorporation by reference two 
centuries ago when it stopped making sense. Instead, we allowed the dogma to 
lie dormant in our judicial system by blindly complying with its exception. One 
can now see that it was not a benign practice after all. With the emergence of 
heightened pleading standards, it is possible that the dogma, like the herpes 
virus, will come back even more powerful and manifest itself in unpredictable 
ways. 
E.  RELATED ISSUES OF INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE 
The objective of this Article is to discuss the incorporation of allegations 
made previously in the same pleading. But incorporation by reference exists in 
other situations. 
One example is the incorporation of allegations and claims made in 
previous pleadings or motions in the same proceeding.247 This strategy, although 
unnecessary, is commonly used in complex and multiparty litigation.248 But 
practical complications may arise when the incorporation refers to a pleading 
that was amended, abandoned, or superseded.249 This was a valid concern before 
the electronic age, when parts of a file could be archived in a different physical 
 
 244. See Mower v. Simpson, 278 P.3d 1076, 1082 (Utah Ct. App. 2012). 
 245. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 246. It will not escape an attentive reader that this Article contains a series of “incorporations by reference” 
through footnotes that make cross references to other Parts where related information is developed. 
 247. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b) (“A later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier 
pleading.”). 
 248. See 5 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 62, ¶ 3014.05; 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, 
§ 1326.05. 
 249. See 2 PARNESS, supra note 4, § 10.04; 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1326; see also Hinton v. 
Trans Union, LLC, 654 F. Supp. 2d 440 (E.D. Va. 2009) (criticizing incorporation of allegations in a superseding 
complaint because it was not direct and explicit, stating that “wholesale incorporations—particularly those that 
seek to incorporate superseded versions of a complaint—must be examined with special care, and dismissing 
the case after two amendments, making this one of those senseless decisions that hurt people by inappropriately 
making a legal rule out of a silly baseball metaphor). 
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location.250 But it lost its force now that previous pleadings are available at the 
click of a mouse. 
A similar complication occurs when an amended pleading supersedes the 
previous one but fails to refer to or adopt some element contained in the 
superseded pleading.251 It is usually considered that “[w]here an amendment is 
complete in itself and does not refer to or adopt the prior pleading, the earlier 
pleading ceases to be a part of the record for most purposes, being in effect 
abandoned and withdrawn.”252 Although this is the general rule in case law, the 
rules of only one state explicitly limits the practice to a pleading that has not 
been superseded.253 In addition, while most states allow incorporation by 
reference “in the same pleading or in any other pleading or motion,” the rules in 
three states explicitly limit the practice to the same pleading.254  
Another related issue is the incorporation of statements made (or 
documents) in a different lawsuit. Although Rule 10(c) does not contain any 
limitation, this practice is not allowed, even if the parties are the same and the 
proceedings are related, because it fails to give the opponent (and the court) 
adequate notice.255 The rules in a few states expressly limit incorporation by 
 
 250. See, e.g., Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 3 F.R.D. 220, 226 (S.D.N.Y 1943) (“[I]t is quite 
inconvenient to the court to have to send to the Clerk’s office for a file in order to learn the contents of exhibits 
attached to the discarded pleading.”). The Oppenheimer court sua sponte suggested (but did not require) the 
plaintiff to attach the documents again when drafting the amended complaint. 
 251. See 5 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 62, ¶ 3014.05; 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, 
§ 1326. 
 252. See McDonald v. Lipov, 13 N.E.3d 179, 191 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Foxcroft Townhome Owners Ass’n v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 449 N.E.2d 125, 126 (Ill. 1983)); see 
also Baker v. Louisville & N. Terminal Co., 61 S.W. 1029 (Tenn. 1901). But see McManus v. Williams, 519 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing El–Hadad v. Embassy of the U.A.E., 69 F. Supp. 2d 69, 71 n.1 (D.D.C. 
1999) (allowing incorporation by reference of a superseded complaint), rev’d in part by 216 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 
2000)). 
 253. TEX. R. CIV. P. 58 (“Statements in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the 
same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion, so long as the pleading containing such statements has 
not been superseded by an amendment as provided by Rule 65.”). 
 254. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 2.113(D) (“Statements in a pleading may be adopted by reference only in 
another part of the same pleading.”); Derderian v. Genesys Health Care Sys., 689 N.W.2d 145, 162–63 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2004) (not allowing incorporation by reference to another pleading, only the same pleading); 1 
LONGHOFER, supra note 234, § 2113.4 (stating that the previous Michigan procedural rules allowed 
incorporation by reference in other pleadings and motions). The other two states that explicitly do not allow 
incorporation by reference to another pleading are Mississippi and Oregon. 
 255. See 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 151 (2019); PATRICK M. CONNORS, PRACTICE COMMENTARY, MCKINNEY’S 
CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK, CPLR C3014 (2015); 2 PARNESS, supra note 4, § 10.04; 5A WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 4, § 1326; see also, e.g., Muttathottil v. Gordon H. Mansfield, 381 F. App'x 454, 457 (5th 
Cir. 2010); Gooden v. Crain, 255 F. App'x 858, 862 (5th Cir. 2007); Rohde v. Rippy Surveying Co., 132 F.3d 
1455 (5th Cir. 1997); Tex. Water Supply Corp. v. R. F. C., 204 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1953); Bronstein v. Biava, 
838 P.2d 968 (N.M. 1992); Hill v. Hill Spinning Co., 94 S.E.2d 677 (N.C. 1956). But see 2 KERR, supra note 
100, § 730 (allowing incorporation of statements in a different lawsuit); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Residential 
Funding Co., LLC, 843 F. Supp. 2d 191, 215 & n.15 (D. Mass. 2012) (considering arguments from joint briefs 
filed in eight different cases because the court was “familiar with the filings in the other eight cases, which 
[were] substantially similar to this case, and the usual concerns about inferring arguments from other 
submissions have less force”). 
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reference to statements made the same action.256 And one state allows 
incorporation by reference “in another pleading in the same court.”257 
A fourth related issue is the application of this centuries-old trial rule in the 
appellate context. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, for 
example, has listed it among the “disfavored practices: “Incorporating by 
reference portions of lower court or agency briefs or pleadings is disapproved 
and does not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
28(a) and (b).”258 Incorporation of lower court filings would allow parties to 
circumvent page limitations on appellate briefs and unnecessarily complicate the 
task of appellate judges.259 Moreover, the mere repetition of arguments already 
made in first instance does not explain why the lower court erred in rejecting 
them.260 As a result, the Tenth Circuit has consistently declined to consider 
arguments made through incorporation by reference to lower court materials, 
treating the incorporated arguments as waived, even for pro se litigants.261 
Yet another related issue is the incorporation of documents by reference.262 
At common law, a written instrument could not be part of a pleading by mere 
attachment and reference.263 If a document was the foundation of a claim or 
defense, the pleader had to transcribe it in full (or in part, if allowed) in the body 
of the pleading.264 Code pleading borrowed incorporation of documents by 
reference from equity practice so that pleaders would not have to transcribe the 
contents of documents into pleadings265 and so that the same document could be 
 
 256. See N.C. R. CIV. P. 10(c) (“Statements in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of 
the same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion in the action.” (emphasis added)); PA. R. CIV. P. 
1019(g) (“Any part of a pleading may be incorporated by reference in another part of the same pleading or in 
another pleading in the same action.” (emphasis added)); VT. R. CIV. P. 10(c) (“Statements in a pleading may be 
adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion in the same 
action.” (emphasis added)). 
 257. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 853 (2018) (“A statement in a pleading may be adopted by reference 
in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading in the same court.”). 
 258. 10TH CIR. R. 28.3(b). 
 259. See Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 624 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 260. See Capital Dev. Affiliates LLC v. Zealand Benjamin Thigpen, III, 744 F. App'x 594, 596 (10th Cir. 
2018). 
 261. See, e.g., United States v. Riddle, 731 F. App'x 771, 783 (10th Cir. 2018); Rodgers v. Beechcraft Corp., 
No. 17-5045, 2018 WL 6615315, at *20 (10th Cir. Dec. 14, 2018); United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 
1137 n.15 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Patterson, 713 F.3d 1237, 1250 (10th Cir. 2013); Argota v. Miller, 
424 F. App’x 769, 771 (10th Cir. 2011); Wardell v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954, 963‒64 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Plaintiff's 
pro se status does not except him from such established rules.”). 
 262. See BAILEY & FISHMAN, supra note 165, § 29:4.20; 2 PARNESS, supra note 4, § 10.05; 5 WEINSTEIN, 
KORN & MILLER, supra note 62, ¶¶ 3014.05, 3014.14; 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, §§ 1326–27. 
 263. See SHIPMAN, supra note 12, § 290 (Henry Winthrop Ballantine ed., 3d ed. 1923) (“It is a technical rule 
that common-law pleading cannot be done by exhibits.”); Pearsons v. Lee, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 193, 194–95 (1835) 
(concluding that the court is not permitted to look at an annexed copy of a contract “with legal eyes” because it 
is not part of the complaint). 
 264. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 50, §§ 327–33. 
 265. See CLARK, supra note 4, § 37. For a more recent example, see FREER, supra note 6, § 7.3.1 (“These 
provisions are helpful. If the case involves a dispute over a contract, the plaintiff may simply append a copy of 
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used in different counts.266 Since 1938, however, “a copy of a written instrument 
that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”267 There 
has been dispute, however, over what material constitutes a “written 
instrument.”268 
None of these practices are dealt with in this Article, which is exclusively 
about incorporation by reference at each count within a pleading. But they too 
are antiquated and must be updated to the twenty-first century. 
CONCLUSION 
The practice of blindly following tradition recollects the old story of the 
new couple making their first dinner together. The husband is troubled because 
the wife cut off the ends of the roast: “but that’s the best part!”, he says. She 
answers, confidently: “That’s the way my mother always made it.” The 
following week, the couple visits the mother, as she prepares the famous recipe. 
The young bride is sure she must be missing some vital information, so she 
inquires her mother. The explanation is comforting: “That’s the way my mother 
always made it.” Grandma’s eyesight was failing, but she could hear a pin drop. 
She lumbered into the kitchen and finally clarified the situation: “We have 
always been poor and cutting the ends was the only way it would fit our small 
oven.” 
That the legal profession cannot get rid of such an obviously meaningless 
formula is a hint about how clueless we may be about other things that really 
matter. If this could pass undetected for centuries, what else have we been doing 
that makes no sense? 
A treatise proposed relaxing the application of Federal Rule 10(c) along 
the same lines as the New York rule, but advised that “good pleading practice 
requires that express incorporations should be used to avoid any ambiguity and 
any risk.”269 
This suggestion is not based on reason or knowledge, but merely a 
rationalization of a historical accident. The fear that a judge will miss an element 
of a cause of action merely because it was stated half a dozen or a hundred pages 
 
the contract to the complaint . . . . without the make-work of having to retype the entire contract into the 
complaint.”). 
 266. See PHILLIPS, supra note 12, § 203 (“Where several causes of action are founded upon an instrument, 
a copy of which is required to be filed with the pleading, and but one copy is filed, each cause of action should 
refer to the copy as filed with that cause of action.”). 
 267. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3014 (McKinney 1962) (“A copy of any writing 
which is attached to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.”). 
 268. Compare Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 116 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Rose v. Bartle, 871 
F.2d 331, 339 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding that an affidavit does not constitute a “written instrument”)), with 
N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he term 
‘written instrument’ . . . include[s] . . . affidavits.” (citing Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1085 (7th 
Cir. 1969), overruled on other grounds by City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973)). 
 269. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1326. 
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earlier has no place in real life. Not in the twenty-first century, at least. There is 
no risk of ambiguity if a count does not expressly incorporate facts stated before 
in the same pleading. 
A complaint must be read as a whole. If a plaintiff described an act of 
violence several pages earlier, the judge will remember it when the plaintiff asks 
for compensatory and punitive damages at the end of the document. More 
important, if by the time the plaintiff asks for damages, the plaintiff needs to 
remind the judge of what happened, abstractly repeating, realleging, and 
reiterating paragraphs 1 to 45 would not improve the judge’s memory of what 
happened. If information is essential to understanding any part of a text, if its 
omission will create ambiguity, the plaintiff may want to summarize the 
information again and make a cross reference to specific paragraphs, containing 
further details. 
American lawyers unquestioningly repeat the old formula, never stopping 
to think why or even if they have to. “It doesn’t hurt and will keep me out of 
trouble,” they may think. But it is a ritualistic recitation, and its omission will 
not affect the outcome of the case. When lawyers abolish this silly practice, no 
one will miss these pointless paragraphs cluttering our pleadings. 
The most important step now is to recognize that there is no dogma that all 
counts must be complete within one pleading. Based on this realization, once the 
mechanical practice stops, one could discuss the peculiar and more complex 
situations where cross references may be useful. 
A national organization, such as The American Law Institute, the 
American Association of Law Schools, or the American Bar Association could 
take on the broader charge of identifying useless words in the practice of law. 
The project could address antiquated terminology, boilerplate, useless words 
(come now, by and between, wherefore), and mysterious formulas (null and void 
and of no force or effect, due and payable, give and grant, indemnify and hold 
harmless). This work will require extensive research, but will have an immediate 
impact in the practice of law, freeing lawyers and judges from old formulas and 
opening our minds to new ideas. 
Ideally, lawyers should just stop incorporating by reference. Abolishing 
incorporation by reference demands a culture change, in which lawyers will 
write purposefully, not reflexively. But lawyers are risk averse and have little 
incentive to stop, even if the formula makes no sense. For decades, courts and 
commentators have sent mixed and ambiguous messages, scaring the profession 
into complying with this ghost obligation. And lawyers have been doing this for 
so long that it is now difficult to stop. Without judicial assurance, no lawyer will 
want to risk the public humiliation of being ordered to amend or having a count 
dismissed (or whatever mythical consequence happens to lawyers who fail to 
incorporate). 
Therefore, courts must give clear signals that the dogma of complete counts 
is a thing of the past, and that it is okay to stop repeating and realleging at each 
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count. Judges could address the issue in dicta, strike these formulas sua sponte, 
order the parties to amend pleadings to exclude redundant and immaterial 
paragraphs, or issue standing orders against the practice. 
Lawyers can also take the initiative by moving to strike these formulas 
from each other’s pleadings. The motion may not be granted because the 
surplusage is not prejudicial, but the court will have to address the issue, leaving 
a trail of precedents. We have to start somewhere. From there, we can rethink 
legal instruction and rewrite formbooks. Only then can we look back and be 
deservedly embarrassed by this practice, like we are of our hair in old pictures. 
Rule 10(c) does not need to be amended, only correctly interpreted: it 
merely allows cross references within a pleading, but does not require all counts 
to be complete. A musician cannot blame the music sheet for a bad performance. 
A slight change in its first sentence, however, would send a clearer message to 
the legal profession: instead of saying that statements may be “adopted,” it could 
say that statements may be “referred to.” The use of a more informal verb, 
coupled with a one-sentence Advisory Committee Note, should dissolve any 
lingering power of the dogma of complete counts. 
As this Article has demonstrated, the dogma that each count in a pleading 
must be complete has been dead and forgotten in the United States for almost a 
century. And the practice of incorporation by reference is nonexistent in other 
countries. Yet, because it was not given a proper burial, its ghost continues to 
haunt the American legal profession. Let this Article be the memorial that 
forever puts this dogma to rest, and frees American lawyers from a pointless 
tradition. 
Requiescet in pace. 
  
